Unarticulated Constituents by Recanati, François
Unarticulated Constituents
Franc¸ois Recanati
To cite this version:
Franc¸ois Recanati. Unarticulated Constituents. Linguistics and Philosophy, Springer Verlag,
2002, 25, pp.299-345. <ijn 00000086>
HAL Id: ijn 00000086
http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn 00000086
Submitted on 27 Jun 2002
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
1 
Unarticulated Constituents 
François Recanati 
 
Abstract 
In a recent paper (Linguistics and Philosophy 23:4, June 2000), Jason Stanley argues that there are no 
'unarticulated constituents', contrary to what advocates of Truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP) have 
claimed. All truth-conditional effects of context can be traced to logical form, he says. In this paper I 
maintain that there are unarticulated constituents, and I defend TCP. Stanley's argument exploits the fact 
that the alleged unarticulated constituents can be 'bound', that is, they can be made to vary with the 
values introduced by operators in the sentence. I show that Stanley's argument rests on a fallacy, and I 
provide alternative analyses of the data. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. SATURATION AND FREE ENRICHMENT 
According to a widespread view, context comes into play in truth-conditional 
interpretation only to help determine the denotation of indexicals and other context-
sensitive expressions. Such expressions are like free variables to which a semantic 
value must be contextually assigned. In some cases the contextual assignment is 
automatic and rule-governed. Thus the reference of ‗I‘ is determined automatically on 
the basis of a linguistic rule, without taking the speaker‘s beliefs and intentions into 
consideration. In other cases the denotation of a context-sensitive expression is 
determined on a pragmatic basis. For example, a possessive phrase such as ‗John‘s car‘ 
arguably means something like the car that bears relation R to John. The free variable 
‗R’ must be contextually assigned a particular value; but that value is not determined by 
a rule. What a given occurrence of the phrase ‗John‘s car‘ means ultimately depends 
upon what the speaker who utters it means. That dependence upon speaker‘s meaning  
is a characteristic feature of ‗semantically underdetermined‘ expressions, which are 
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pervasive in natural language. 
I call ‗saturation‘ the contextual assignment of semantic value to a context-
sensitive expression, whether that assignment is fully pragmatic or governed by a 
linguistic rule. Everybody agrees that, owing to the context-sensitivity of natural 
language sentences, some such process must take place in order to fix truth-conditions. 
Much more controversial is the claim, made by some theorists, that another, very 
different type of contextual process is also involved in truth-conditional interpretation. 
While saturation is a ‗bottom-up‘ process, i.e. a process triggered (and made 
obligatory) by a linguistic expression in the sentence itself, the other type of contextual 
process is not bottom-up, but ‗top-down‘. Far from being mandated by an expression in 
the sentence, it takes place for purely pragmatic reasons. 
 To give a standard example, suppose someone asks me, at about lunch time, 
whether I am hungry. I reply: 
 
(1) I‘ve had a very large breakfast. 
 
In this context, my utterance conversationally implicates that I am not hungry. In order 
to retrieve the implicature, the interpreter must first understand what is stated — the 
input to the inferential process responsible for implicature generation. That input is the 
proposition that the speaker has had a very large breakfast... when? No time is specified 
in the sentence, which merely describes the posited event as past. On the other hand, the 
implicature that the speaker is not hungry could not be derived if the said breakfast was 
not understood as having taken place on the day of utterance. Here we arguably have a 
case where something (the temporal location of the breakfast event on the day of 
utterance) is part of the intuitive truth-conditions of theutterance yet does not 
correspond to anything in the sentence itself.
1
 If this is right, then the temporal location 
of the breakfast event is an unarticulated constituent of the statement made by uttering 
                                                 
1 That analysis, which comes from  Sperber and Wilson 1986:189-190, is not the only possible one. In 
Recanati 1993, pp. 257-258, I suggest a alternative treatment of that example in terms of saturation. 
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the sentence in that context. 
 Such unarticulated constituents, which are part of the statement made even 
though they correspond to nothing in the uttered sentence, arguably result from a 
pragmatic process of free enrichment — ‗free‘ in the sense of not being linguistically 
controlled. What triggers the contextual provision of the relevant temporal specification 
in example (1) is not something in the sentence but simply the fact that the utterance is 
meant as an answer to a question about the speaker‘s present state of hunger (which 
state can be causally affected only by a breakfast taken on the same day). 
  The prototypical example of an utterance whose interpretation involves an 
unarticulated constituent is the sentence ‗It is raining‘, used to talk about a particular 
place (typically, the place of utterance). It is in connection with that example that the 
phrase ‗unarticulated constituent‘ was first introduced (Perry 1993: 206). In contrast to 
the time of utterance, which is (indexically) articulated in the sentence via the present 
tense, the place of utterance is an unarticulated constituent of the proposition which the 
utterance expresses, Perry argues. The speaker could have said ‗It‘s raining here‘. If she 
had said so, the place would be (indexically) articulated. But in ‗It‘s raining‘, there is 
nothing in the sentence that stands for a place. Still we understand the utterance as 
saying something about a particular place and as true iff it is raining at that place. 
 The pragmatics literature is full of similar examples. Let me mention one that 
has become a classic: 
 
(2) Mary took out her key and opened the door 
 
In virtue of a ‗bridging inference‘, we naturally understand the second conjunct as 
meaning that Mary opened the door with the key mentioned in the first conjunct ; yet 
this is not explicitly articulated in the sentence. Insofar as the bridging inference affects 
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the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance, it does so as a result of free enrichment.
2
 
The same thing can be said about Kent Bach‘s example where a mother says (3) to her 
child who cries because of a minor cut : 
 
(3) You‘re not going to die 
 
This is interpreted in context as : You’re not going to die from that cut. The restriction 
‗from that cut‘ results from free enrichment. The sentence itself conveys no such thing 
– it simply says that the child is not going to die. 
 A last example comes not from the pragmatics literature, but from John Searle‘s 
related work on what he calls the ‗background‘. According to Searle, there are many 
things that we take for granted both in speaking and in interpreting the utterances of 
others. Among those things we take for granted, some are articulated in the sentence 
itself: they are the ‗presuppositions‘ of the sentence. Thus if I say that John has stopped 
smoking, I (must) presuppose that he smoked before, in virtue of the appropriateness 
conditions of the verb ‗to stop‘. But there are also things we take for granted which are 
in no way articulated in the sentence itself. Searle calls them ‗background assumptions‘. 
For example, 
 
Suppose I go into the restaurant and order a meal. Suppose I say, speaking literally, 
‗Bring me a steak with fried potatoes.‘ (...) I take it for granted that they will not 
deliver the meal to my house, or to my place of work. I take it for granted that the 
steak will not be encased in concrete, or petrified. It will not be stuffed into my 
pockets or spread over my head. But none of these assumptions was made explicit in 
the literal utterance. (Searle 1992: 180) 
 
Though unarticulated, those assumptions contribute to determining the intuitive 
conditions of satisfaction (obedience-conditions, truth-conditions, etc.) of the utterance. 
                                                 
2  The term ‗bridging inference‘ was originally introduced by Herb Clark, a pioneer of pragmatic 
studies, in the seventies (see Clark and Haviland 1974 and 1977). Example (2) is discussed in Carston 
(1988). 
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The order ‗Bring me a steak with fried potatoes‘ does not count as satisfied if the steak 
is delivered, encased in concrete, to the customer‘s house. It is mutually manifest to 
both the hearer and the speaker that the speaker intends the ordered meal to be placed in 
front of him on the restaurant table he is sitting at, etc. Though not explicitly said, that 
is clearly part of what is meant. Yet one does not want to say that that aspect of 
utterance meaning is conveyed indirectly or nonliterally (as when one says something 
and means something else). The utterance ‗Bring me a steak with fried potatoes‘ is fully 
literal. It is a property of literal and serious utterances that their conditions of 
satisfaction systematically depend upon unstated background assumptions. 
According to the view we arrive at (and in contrast to the ‗widespread view‘ we 
started with) various contextual processes come into play in the determination of an 
utterance‘s intuitive truth-conditions; not merely saturation — the contextual 
assignment of values to indexicals and free variables in the logical form of the sentence 
— but also free enrichment and other processes which are not linguistically triggered 
but are pragmatic through and through. That view I will henceforth refer to as ‗Truth-
conditional pragmatics‘ (TCP). 
 
1.2. THE ARGUMENT FROM BINDING 
Many theorists think one should not allow top-down processes, which are pragmatic 
through and through, to affect the proposition expressed by an utterance. In order to be 
part of what is literally said, they claim, a contextually provided constituent must at 
least correspond to something in the sentence. It must be ‗articulated‘. This constraint 
is what, in previous writings, I referred to as (Pragmatic) Minimalism.
3
 
 
Minimalism 
What is said is affected by the bottom-up process of saturation but not by top-down 
processes such as free enrichment. 
                                                 
3 According to Minimalism, « a pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said if and 
only if its contextual determination is triggered by the grammar, that is, if the sentence itself sets up a slot 
to be contextually filled » (Recanati 1993: 240). 
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 If one accepts Minimalism, one will say that the aspects of utterance meaning 
which result from free enrichment do not belong to what is strictly and literally said, but 
either are ‗conversational implicatures‘ or (if one wants to restrict the term 
‗conversational implicatures‘ to things that are intuitively ‗implied by‘ the utterance) 
belong to an area of meaning intermediate between what is said and the conversational 
implicatures. Bach calls the things in that area the ‗implicitures‘ of the utterance (Bach 
1994b). 
 Though TCP seems incompatible with Minimalism, it is not really. Two 
different notions of ‗what is said‘ are obviously in play, and to that extent, the quarrel is 
verbal rather than substantive. If the notion of ‗what is said‘ we are trying to 
characterize is meant to capture the intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance, then it 
must be acknowledged that what is said, in that sense, incorporates unarticulated 
constituents and other ‗implicitures‘. That is what the advocate of Truth-conditional 
pragmatics urges. But this does not prevent the semanticist from defining another 
notion of what is said, conforming to Minimalism. Let ‗what is saidmin‘ be the 
proposition expressed by an utterance when the effects of top-down pragmatic 
processes such as free enrichment have been discounted, in accordance with 
Minimalism; and let ‗what is saidint‘ correspond to the intuitive truth-conditions of the 
utterance, which may well result from the operation of such processes. Both what is 
saidmin and what is saidint are influenced by pragmatic factors, but not to the same 
extent. If I am right what is saidint is affected by top-down processes such as free 
enrichment, whereas the only pragmatic processes that are allowed to affect what is 
saidmin are those that are triggered by something in the sentence itself. On this view 
(which I called the ‗syncretic view‘ in Recanati 2001) what is strictly and literally said 
by (1) would be true if the speaker had had a large breakfast only once, twenty years 
ago. But what the speaker of (1) actually states is quite different : it is true iff the 
speaker has had a large breakfast on the day of utterance. 
 Even though TCP and Minimalism turn out to be compatible, there are radical 
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versions of both which cannot be so easily reconciled. On the side of TCP, there is 
Contextualism. Contextualism denies that there is a level of meaning that is both (i) 
truth-evaluable, and (ii) unaffected by top-down factors. John Searle, whom I 
mentioned earlier in connection with TCP, holds such a view. (Another leading 
advocate of Contextualism is Charles Travis.) On the side of Minimalism, there is a 
strong version which is incompatible with TCP. On that version, which I call ‗I-
Minimalism‘ (Recanati forthcoming), even the intuitive truth-conditions of our 
utterances obey the Minimalist constraint: 
 
I-Minimalism 
What is saidint is affected by the bottom-up process of saturation but not by top-down 
processes such as free enrichment. 
 
Examples such as those I gave in section 1.1 are supposed to provide empirical 
evidence that I-Minimalism is mistaken. Even if ‗what is strictly and literally said‘ is 
minimal by definition, the intuitive truth-conditional content of the utterance is affected 
by top-down factors and incorporates unarticulated constituents. That seems obvious 
when one looks at the data. Yet there is at least one author who denies that that is so, 
and defends I-Minimalism. 
In a recent paper, Jason Stanley claims that « for each alleged example of an 
unarticulated constituent [mentioned in the literature], there is an unpronounced 
pronominal element in the logical form of the sentence uttered, whose value is the 
alleged unarticulated constituent » (Stanley 2000 : 410). Though unarticulated at the 
level of surface syntax, the alleged unarticulated constituents turn out to be articulated 
at a deeper level of syntactic analysis. It follows that « we have been given no reason to 
abandon the thesis that the only truth-conditional role of context is the resolution of 
indexicality, broadly construed » (Stanley 2000 : 401). As against TCP, Stanley 
therefore maintains that « all effects of extra-linguistic context on the truth-conditions 
of an assertion are traceable to elements in the actual syntactic structure of the sentence 
uttered » (Stanley 2000: 391). The truth-conditions Stanley talk about here are the 
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intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance.
4
 Stanley‘s defense of Minimalism is 
therefore strikingly unlike the usual defense. The usual defense of Minimalism against 
TCP consists in arguing that a decent semanticist should be concerned not with ‗what is 
said‘ in the intuitive sense (what is saidint), but with something more abstract, which 
satisfies the Minimalist constraint by definition but need not surface to consciousness 
(what is saidmin). That is not Stanley‘s stance. Like the truth-conditional pragmatist, he 
is concerned with what is saidint. Yet he contends that what is said, in that sense, 
conforms to Minimalism as a matter of empirical fact, while the truth-conditional 
pragmatist contends, also on empirical grounds, that it does not conform to 
Minimalism. The disagreement here is a genuine empirical disagreement, not a verbal 
dispute about the proper understanding of the phrase ‗what is said‘. 
Stanley‘s denial that there are unarticulated constituents is supported by the 
following argument : 
 
Since the supposed unarticulated constituent... is not the value of anything in the 
sentence uttered, there should be no reading of the relevant linguistic constructions 
in which the unarticulated constituent varies with the values introduced by operators 
in the sentence uttered. Operators in a sentence only interact with variables in the 
sentence that lie within their scope. But, if the constituent is unarticulated, it is not 
the value of any variable in the sentence. Thus, its interpretation cannot be controlled 
by operators in the sentence. (Stanley 2000: 410-411) 
 
Stanley then uses data of the sort originally collected by Barbara Partee (1989) to show 
that, whenever an alleged unarticulated constituent has been postulated to account for 
the intuitive meaning of an utterance, one can intuitively ‗bind‘ the alleged 
                                                 
4 Semantic interpretation, Stanley says, « involves assigning denotations to the constituents of the logical 
form, and combining them in accord with composition rules… What results… is what is expressed by the 
assertion… If the process is successful, the proposition it yields is one the interpreter would recognize as 
the proposition expressed by that assertion. » (Stanley forthcoming, italics mine). This is reminiscent of 
my ‗Availability Principle‘ (Recanati 1993, 2001), which Stanley seems to endorse. Further evidence is 
provided by the passage from Stanley and Szabo 2000 quoted at the end of this paper (§4.4). 
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unarticulated constituent, i.e. make it vary according to the values introduced by some 
operator. For instance, the temporal location of the breakfast event, which was said to 
be an unarticulated constituent of the speaker‘s response in example (1), can be bound 
by a quantifier.
5
 We can say: 
 
(4) No luck. Each time you offer me lunch, I‘ve had a very large breakfast. 
 
The temporal location of the breakfast event now systematically varies with the 
temporal values introduced by ‗each time you offer me lunch‘. It follows (according to 
the argument) that the alleged unarticulated constituent in the original example was not 
really unarticulated: it had to be the (contextual) value of a variable in the logical form 
of the sentence, since without a variable there could not be the sort of binding that 
occurs in (4). 
 
1.3. VARIETIES OF UNARTICULATED CONSTITUENT 
Before proceeding, we must draw a couple of distinctions between various sorts of 
alleged ‗unarticulated constituents‘ that have been mentioned in the literature. 
 First, there is an important distinction between the metaphysical variety and the 
communicational variety. An unarticulated constituent belongs to the communicational 
variety to the extent that it is part of the interpretation of an utterance and, as such, is 
‗available‘ to whoever fully understands the utterance. This feature is best appreciated 
by contrast to the other sort of unarticulated constituents — the metaphysical sort, for 
which no such constraint holds. 
It‘s a metaphysical fact that every action takes place somewhere. The action of 
dancing is no exception. It follows that, if we say that Mary danced, we describe a state 
                                                 
5 Stanley does not actually discuss that example, but his general argument applies nonetheless. The 
examples he discusses are: ‗It‘s raining <here>‘, ‗Sherman is small <for a basketball player>‘, ‗Every 
bottle <on the bookshelf> is green‘, ‗David is at <his> home‘ and a few others. The material within angle 
brackets correspond to the alleged unarticulated constituents. 
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of affairs (Mary‘s dancing) which is bound to involve a place. The place is not 
articulated in the sentence — when we say that ‗Mary danced‘, we do not say that she 
danced in place l, nor even that she danced somewhere. No place is articulated in the 
uttered sentence, yet in virtue of the fact that the sentence describes an action, a truth-
maker for that sentence is bound to involve a place. The place, therefore, is a 
(metaphysical) unarticulated constituent of the statement that is made by an utterance of 
the sentence ‗Mary danced‘. In the same sense, one may say, with John Perry, that the 
relevant inertial frame is an unarticulated constituent of the statement that event A and 
event B were simultaneous, even though neither the speaker nor the hearer are aware of 
this. Or one may say that a certain time zone is an unarticulated constituent of my five-
year-old daughter‘s statement that it is four o‘clock, even though she has never heard of 
time zones. 
 For something to count as an unarticulated constituent in the communicational 
sense, it must be part and parcel of what the speaker means by his or her utterance. 
Thus the speaker who says ‗It‘s raining‘ means that it‘s raining where she is (or at some 
other contextually given place) ; the speaker who, in the above example, says ‗I‘ve had 
breakfast‘ means that she‘s had breakfast on the day of utterance ; and so forth. On the 
hearer‘s side, the unarticulated constituent must be identified on pains of not arriving at 
a proper understanding of the utterance. To understand the speaker‘s utterance of ‗It‘s 
raining‘, one must know which place is such that the speaker‘s utterance is true iff it‘s 
raining at that place. 
 As the rain example shows, something may be an unarticulated constituent both 
metaphysically and communicationally. Like dancing, raining metaphysically requires a 
place to occur in. Though it is an unarticulated constituent of the statement ‗Mary 
danced‘ from a metaphysical point of view, however, the place where the dancing took 
place is not an unarticulated constituent of the statement from the communicational 
point of view. One can understand ‗Mary danced‘ without identifying a particular place 
as the place where, according to the speaker, the event occurred. But, as John Perry and 
others emphasized, one cannot understand ‗It‘s raining‘ without knowing which place is 
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in question. The place of rain is an unarticulated constituent of the statement that it‘s 
raining both metaphysically and communicationally. 
 Like Stanley, I am concerned exclusively with unarticulated constituents of the 
communicational variety in this paper ; metaphysical matters will be touched upon only 
in passing, to the extent that they have a bearing on communicational issues. I will 
therefore consistently use the phrase ‗unarticulated constituents‘ as an abbreviation for : 
unarticulated constituents from a communicational point of view. Now, within that 
category, there is another important distinction between two sorts of cases — a 
distinction that will loom large in what follows. The distinction can be framed in terms 
of what happens when the alleged unarticulated constituent is not actually supplied in 
interpreting the utterance. 
In a first sort of case, most commonly discussed in the pragmatics literature, an 
interpreter‘s failure to retrieve the unarticulated constituent results in a mismatch : the 
proposition which the utterance is taken to express is not the proposition actually 
asserted by the speaker, but (typically) a less specific proposition. If, in interpreting 
utterance (1), we don‘t supply the unarticulated constituent (the day of utterance, to 
which the speaker tacitly refers), the time of the described event remains unspecified, 
except for the feature ‗past‘. The utterance is then understood as expressing the 
proposition that the speaker has had a very large breakfast at some (unspecified) time in 
the past — not necessarily on the day of utterance.6 Similarly, in example (2), a failure 
to provide the unarticulated constituent in interpreting the utterance results in a 
mismatch : the utterance is understood as saying that Mary took out her key and opened 
the door in some way or other (not necessarily with the key in question). This is a less 
specific proposition than that which the speaker actually meant to assert. The less 
specific proposition which we get if we discount the unarticulated constituents is what 
in earlier writings I called the ‗minimal‘ proposition expressed by the utterance. It is 
                                                 
6  As Sperber and Wilson point out, this is how an utterance like ‗I‘ve eaten camel‘ or ‗I‘ve been to 
Tibet‘ is ordinarily understood : no contextual specification of the time of the described event takes place 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 189-190). 
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also what most semanticists would identify as ‗what is strictly and literally said‘ (what 
is saidmin). 
 In the other type of case, discussed by John Perry and those who have followed 
him, failure to provide the unarticulated constituent is said to result in vacuity : no 
proposition is expressed, if we discount the unarticulated constituent. According to 
Perry, that is what happens in the ‗It‘s raining‘ case : if we don‘t supply a place, the 
utterance is semantically incomplete and cannot be evaluated for truth or falsity. The 
verb ‗to rain‘, Perry says, denotes a dyadic relation — a relation between times and 
places. In a given place, it doesn‘t just rain or not, it rains at some times while not 
raining at others; similarly, at a given time, it rains in some places while not raining in 
others. To evaluate a statement of rain as true or false, Perry says, we need both a time 
and a place, but the statement ‗It is raining‘ explicitly gives us only the two-place 
relation (supplied by the verb) and the temporal argument (supplied by the present 
tense). The locational argument must be contextually supplied for the utterance to 
express a complete proposition. Similarly, faced with an utterance like 
 
(5) They are leaving because they‘ve had enough, 
 
we must answer the question : enough of what ? before we can evaluate the utterance as 
true or false. An unarticulated constituent must be contextually supplied to complete the 
utterance. Unless such a constituent is provided, the utterance fails to express a definite 
proposition, just as it does if the pronoun ‗they‘ remains contextually uninterpreted.  
 Let us call the first type of case (where failure to provide the constituent results 
in a mismatch) the ‗A-type‘, and the second type of case (where failure to provide the 
constituent results in vacuity) the ‗B-type‘. In part 2, I will attempt to show that B-type 
unarticulated constituents are 'unarticulated' only in a weak sense ; a sense which is 
irrelevant to the debate between TCP and I-Minimalism. Only strong (or genuine) 
unarticulatedness matters to that debate, I will argue. In part 3, I will refute Stanley‘s 
argument to the effect that all alleged unarticulated constituents — including A-type 
cases — are in fact values contextually assigned to free variables in logical form. 
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Finally, in part 4, I will show how the complex type of example used by Stanley in 
support of his view can be analysed in the framework of TCP. 
 
2. TESTING FOR UNARTICULATEDNESS 
 
2.1. B-TYPE UNARTICULATED CONSTITUENTS 
B-type unarticulated constituents are constituents of the truth-conditional interpretation 
of an utterance which are not syntactically articulated in the uttered sentence, yet 
cannot be disregarded without making the utterance semantically unevaluable. Thus 
 
 (6) John plays well 
 
can be understood as meaning that John plays the cello well, or that he plays chess well. 
There has to be something which John is said to play well, for the utterance to express 
a definite proposition.
7
 Yet that thing is not articulated in the sentence. The notion of 
an unarticulated constituent was originally introduced by John Perry in connection with 
such (B-type) cases. 
 We find a similar notion in Bach‘s writings about semantic underdetermination 
and ‗completion‘ (e.g. Bach 1994a: 268-269). According to Bach, if someone says that 
‗John is too short‘, what John is too short for must be identified in order to assign a 
truth-value to the statement. (The utterance does not express the proposition that John is 
too short for something or other.) Yet that constituent of the proposition is not 
syntactically articulated, as it would be if the speaker had said ‗He is too short to be a 
British policeman’. The sentence is not even elliptical, Bach insists: it is syntactically 
complete as it is. Yet it is semantically incomplete, like Perry‘s rain example. Without 
the unarticulated constituent provided through ‗completion‘, the sentence expresses 
only a ‗propositional radical‘. Other examples mentioned by Bach include: 
                                                 
7  This is debatable. It can be argued that (6) has a reading on which it it means that John plays well in 
general (whatever game is at issue). (See section §2.3 for similar remarks about ‗It‘s raining‘.) 
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 (argumental underdetermination) 
Mary finished. (what?) 
The cow jumped over. (what?) 
Gentlemen prefer blondes. (to what?) 
Mutual knowledge is not relevant. (to what?) 
John is ready. (for what?) 
 
(parametric underdetermination) 
That lamp is short/cheap/old. (relative to what?) 
That employee is good/talented/valuable. (in what respect?) 
Even cowgirls sing the blues. (in addition to whom?) 
 
Many other examples often discussed in the literature on context-sensitivity (e.g. 
implicitly relational words like ‗local‘, ‗enemy‘ or ‗home‘) also require completion, and 
are treated by Perry as illustrating the phenomenon of unarticulated constituency (Perry 
1998). 
 A significant number of the examples discussed by Stanley belong to that 
category. They are B-type unarticulated constituents. But, I will argue, it is a mistake to 
discuss such examples in connection with the debate about TCP and free enrichment (as 
Stanley does). Whenever completion is required in order to get a full-fledged 
proposition, the constituent which has to be contextually provided is ipso facto not an 
unarticulated constituent in the (strong) sense that is relevant to the debate between 
TCP and I-Minimalism. To be sure, the constituent is unarticulated in some sense. 
There is a difference of explicitness between ‗John is too short‘ and ‗John is too short to 
be a British policeman‘; a difference that can be captured by saying that something 
which is articulated in the second sentence remains unarticulated in the first one (see 
below). Still, what Bach describes as ‗completion‘ is but a special case of saturation, 
hence not an instance of free enrichment at all. 
 Take the adjective ‗small‘, which is an instance of ‗parametric 
underdetermination‘. It expresses a complete content only when a comparison class has 
been provided. That is a conventional, linguistic property of the expression. (Or so I  
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claim.)
8
 The need for completion is an integral part of the meaning of the adjective, 
just as it is an integral part of the meaning of the genitive. ‗John‘s car‘ means the car 
that bears R to John; no definite content is expressed unless the free variable ‗R’ has 
been given a value. Similarly, ‗small‘ means small for an F. No definite content is 
expressed by a sentence such as ‗Sherman is small‘ unless a value is provided for the 
variable ‗F’. 
That is not to say that there is no difference between expressions like ‗small‘ 
and, say, the genitive. In certain respects they behave quite differently. For example, the 
genitive is not bindable, that is, the value of the variable ‗R’ must always be 
contextually identified and cannot vary according to the values introduced by some 
operator in the sentence. In contrast, many expressions in need of contextual 
completion are bindable, as Partee (1989) and Mitchell (1986) first pointed out. Thus 
Stanley gives the following example (to show that the adjective ‗small‘ carries with it a 
free variable): 
 
Most species have members that are small 
 
Here, instead of being contextually specified, the comparison class varies with the 
values introduced by ‗most species‘: each species in turn serves as comparison class for 
                                                 
8  One of the referees was unconvinced. « Compare the case of ‗weigh‘. Since weight is relative to a 
gravitational field, (…) ‗John weighs 150 lbs.‘ has to be interpreted relative to the gravitational field at 
the surface of the earth», but that does not seem to be in virtue of a convention of English. What‘s the 
relevant difference between ‗weigh‘ and ‗small‘ ? My tentative answer is this. We know, as English 
speakers, that ‗small‘ is a relative predicate. Without such knowledge, we would be unable to ascribe 
truth-conditions to sentences involving that predicate (since the contextual parameter is liable to vary 
from utterance to utterance). ‗Weigh‘ is also a relative predicate, as the referee points out, but we don‘t 
(have to) know that in order to be linguistically competent. That piece of knowledge is not required to 
assign truth-conditions to sentences involving ‗weigh‘, because the relevant parameter is held constant.  
See §1.3 on the difference between the communicational and the metaphysical. 
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smallness. But this difference between bindable and unbindable context-sensitive 
expressions is irrelevant to the articulatedness issue. We find exactly the same 
difference between indexical expressions (in the broad sense): some — e.g. ‗I‘, ‗here‘, 
‗now‘ — are rigid and unbindable, others — third-person pronouns, demonstratives — 
are flexible and bindable. In all cases, however, when a definite value is contextually 
provided for the indexical, it is obviously articulated (by the indexical itself). Similarly, 
in the other type of example, I think the contextually provided element (the comparison 
class, or the relation R) is somehow ‗articulated‘, in virtue of the simple fact that its 
contextual provision is required for the interpretation of a particular linguistic 
expression. 
 From what I have just said it follows that the lexical items in need of completion 
in Bach‘s examples are somewhat similar to indexicals and can receive a similar 
treatment. Consider, for instance, ‗John is too short‘. Arguably, ‗too‘ maps the property 
of being short onto a different property: the property of being too short, that is, the 
property of being short to a degree n such that any degree of shortness equal or superior 
to n prevents a certain condition c (e.g. being a British policeman) from obtaining. 
(This is very rough, I admit.) The content of ‗too‘ can therefore be construed as a 
certain function ftoo from properties to properties. But that content is not fixed once for 
all; it varies contextually. For, as we have seen, the condition c must be specified or 
identified;
9
 otherwise the construction is semantically incomplete. Different conditions 
c will determine different functions ftoo as contents for the adverb ‗too‘: too __ to be 
true, too __ to be a British policeman, etc. ‗Too‘ can therefore be treated as an 
expression with an ‗unstable character‘ (Kaplan 1989). The character of ‗too‘ can be 
represented as a (partial) function from contexts to contents, mapping contexts in which 
a certain condition c is pragmatically salient to the functions ftoo which are the content 
of ‗too‘ in those contexts. In this framework, ‗too‘ is an indexical adverb, like ‗thus‘. 
(On indexical adverbs, see Heal 1997.) 
 The same sort of analysis can be made to work for all the ‗completion‘ type of 
                                                 
9 This is in contrast to the degree n, which does not have to be identified or specified. 
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examples discussed by Stanley. Just as the reference of an indexical depends upon the 
context, the determinate property expressed by a predicate such as ‗small‘, ‗local‘ or 
‗enemy‘ in the relevant examples depends upon a contextual factor, and does so in a 
systematic manner. 
The analogy between indexicality and B-type unarticulated constituency should 
not be pushed too far, however. Expressions like ‗small‘, ‗local‘ etc. have a distinctive 
property which sets them apart from indexicals: they do not always function in an 
indexical manner, but have a dual use.
10
 When the comparison class is made explicit, as 
in ‗Sherman is small for a basketball player‘, the denotation of the complex predicate 
(‗small for a basketball player‘) is independent from extralinguistic context, and the 
expression ‗small‘ no longer functions as an indexical. It is only when the comparison 
class is left implicit, as in ‗Sherman is small‘, that the property denoted by the predicate 
is denoted in a context-dependent manner : the predicate may then still denote the 
property of being small for a basketball player, but it denotes that property only with 
respect to a context in which the class of basketball players is made salient as the 
relevant comparison class. In other contexts the predicate will possibly denote other 
properties, or (if no comparison class is singled out) it will fail to denote anything. The 
dual use of those expressions is interesting because it shows that a constituent of 
content can sometimes shift to the status of contextual parameter.
11
  That, I think, is 
what typically happens in B-type cases. 
                                                 
10 This property does not extend to the genitive, which should therefore be classified in the same 
category as indexicals (pace Crimmins 1992 : 18). 
11 Such a shift arguably goes together with a modification in the valence of the predicate. Take an 
expression like ‗on the left‘. It can function as a one-place predicate, as when I direct you by saying : 
‗The table is on the left‘. That is an indexical one-place predicate : the property it denotes is relativized 
to, and varies with, a point of reference given in the context. If I say ‗The table is on your left‘, ‗on the 
left‘ now functions as a two-place predicate, and is no longer indexical (or not to the same extent). That 
phenomenon, which drove the interest of B-type unarticulated constituent theorists such as Perry, Partee, 
and Barwise, is related to the issue of variable polyadicity which will be dealt with below (§2.4). 
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Let us take stock. When the relevant parameter — the comparison class, in the 
case of ‗small‘ — is contextually provided rather than made explicit in the sentence, 
there is an obvious sense in which the parameter in question is not articulated : no word 
or morpheme in the sentence stands for it. But there is also a sense in which it is 
‗articulated‘, as we have seen : there is an expression in the sentence, namely the 
adjective ‗small‘ itself, that triggers the search for a relevant comparison class, just as 
an indexical triggers the search for an appropriate contextual value. A truly 
unarticulated constituent resulting from free enrichment must not even be articulated in 
that second, weaker sense. It must not result from an obligatory process of saturation or 
‗completion‘. 
Just as there are two senses of ‗articulated‘, there are two senses of 
‗unarticulated‘. In a weak sense, a constituent counts as ‗unarticulated‘ if no word or 
morpheme in the sentence specifically stands for it, even if its contextual provision is 
required for the interpretation of a particular expression in the sentence. B-type 
unarticulated constituents are unarticulated in that sense. In a stronger sense, a 
constituent is unarticulated if it is not linguistically mandated but results from free 
enrichment. Only the strong sense matters to the debate between TCP and I-
Minimalism. I will therefore use ‗unarticulated constituent‘ in the strong sense from 
now on. In that sense, B-type unarticulated constituents are not truly unarticulated. 
Their contextual provision is an instance of saturation, not an instance of free 
enrichment. 
 
2.2. TRUE UNARTICULATED CONSTITUENTS ARE NEVER MANDATORY 
In the previous section I claimed that B-type unarticulated constuents — those 
unarticulated constituents which are necessary for truth-evaluability — are ‗articulated‘ 
to some degree, because there is something in the sentence that triggers/mandates the 
search for the relevant contextual element. But that claim precisely is what Kent Bach 
and John Perry seem to reject. According to them, it is possible for a contextually 
provided constituent to be both necessary for truth-evaluability (B-type) and truly 
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unarticulated. 
To believe in semantically mandatory yet truly unarticulated constituents one 
must hold the following thesis: that the contextual provision of some propositional 
constituent may be semantically necessary (necessary for truth-evaluability) for purely 
metaphysical reasons, without being made necessary by the conventions of the 
language. Consider Perry‘s ‗rain‘ example once again. The verb ‗to rain‘ does not take 
a locational complement, except optionally in the form of an adjunct. Still, Perry tells 
us, the relation which the verb denotes is dyadic — it comprises two argument-roles. 
That is a metaphysical fact about that relation. For that reason, even though, 
syntactically, the ‗place‘ argument-role is optional and does not have to be filled, 
semantically it is foregrounded and requires completion. That is so in virtue of the 
simple fact that that relation is denoted. The situation is the same with other cases of 
‗argumental underdetermination‘. For example, the thing noticed is an argument of the 
relation denoted by ‗notice‘. That argument may remain syntactically unarticulated (‗I 
noticed‘), but it has to be contextually provided since the argument-role which it fills is 
constitutive of the relation which the verb denotes. 
 This line of reasoning presupposes that the same two-place relation is expressed 
or denoted whether or not, syntactically, the verb takes an overt complement. But how 
do we know it is the same relation? In some cases at least, a case can be made in favour 
of treating the objectless verb as denoting not the original two-place relation, but a 
property generated by existentially quantifying the object argument-role of the original 
relation. As Quine pointed out, from any n-place predicate P, one can generate an n-1 
place predicate by applying to P an operator he calls ‗Derelativization‘, which he 
describes as follows: 
 
(Der P) x1...xn-1 iff there is something xn such that Px1...xn 
 
If ‗P‘ is a two-place predicate, ‗Der P‘ will be a genuine one-place predicate, denoting 
a property rather than a relation (Quine 1960: 229-231). 
 How do we know that suppressing the object of the verb in surface syntax does 
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not amount semantically to the same result as applying ‗Der‘ to the original two-place 
predicate? In some cases it seems that it does. Thus consider the verb ‗to eat‘. Among 
the argument-roles that are constitutive of the Eat relation, there is the Eater and the 
Food. From that relation we can extract a property, by existentially quantifying the 
Food argument-role. Let us define the property of eating (Eat1) as the property one has 
in virtue of filling the Eater argument-role in some instance of the dyadic Eat relation 
(Eat2). It follows that one eats1 iff there is something that one eats2. Both the property 
and the relation exist (notwithstanding the fact that the former depends upon the latter). 
We know that the transitive verb ‗eat‘ denotes the relation; but how do we know 
whether the intransitive verb ‗eat‘ (as in ‗John eats when he is nervous‘) denotes the 
same dyadic relation, or the derived property? We can reason as follows: If the dyadic 
relation were expressed, the Food argument-role would require completion (since there 
is no operator to bind it). But no such completion is required: ‗x eats‘ is true iff there is 
something y that x eats2. The fact that the relevant y does not have to be specified 
supports the conclusion that intransitive ‗eat‘ denotes the property of eating1. In 
contrast, intransitive ‗notice‘, as in ‗I noticed‘, behaves differently: ‗x noticed‘ is 
definitely not true iff there is something y which x noticed. Rather, it is true, for some 
contextually specified thing y, iff x noticed that thing. The relevant y has to be specified 
for the utterance to be truth-evaluable.
12
 Similarly, ‗x finished‘ is not true iff there is 
something or other which x finished. The object argument of ‗finish‘ must be specified, 
even if it is unarticulated in surface syntax. This gives us reason to believe that the 
same two-place relation is expressed by ‗finish‘ (or by ‗notice‘) whether or not the 
complement is overtly articulated.
13
 
                                                 
12 On the contrast between the two sorts of verbs, see Fillmore 1986. As Cresswell pointed out, we 
observe the same contrast between two sorts of relational nouns: «Unlike nouns like mother and sister 
whose default cases are existentially quantified the default cases of enemy and of representative appear 
to have the second argument supplied contextually» (Cresswell 1996: 39). 
13 The view I have just sketched seems to conflict with something I said earlier (fn 11). In connection 
with predicates like ‗on the left‘, which have a dual use, I said that the shift from the explicit use to the 
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 To sum up, we cannot assume that the intransitive variant denotes the same two-
place relation as the transitive verb from which it is derived, and conclude that the 
suppressed argument is semantically mandatory (necessary for truth-evaluability). 
Rather, we must look and see whether or not the argument is mandatory, and use the 
empirical fact that it is (or is not) to determine what the verb denotes (the relation or the 
property). The empirical fact in question is a brute linguistic datum. It is a conventional 
property of the English verb ‗eat‘ that (i) it can be used intransitively (in contrast to 
‗devour‘), and (ii) when so used it does not require completion of the suppressed 
argument-role. Similarly, it‘s a conventional property of the English verb ‗finish‘ that 
(i) it too can be used intransitively (in contrast to ‗complete‘), but (ii) when so used it 
                                                                                                                                              
indexical use goes together with a modification in the valence of the predicate: ‗on the left‘ functions as 
an indexical one-place predicate in ‗The table is on the left‘, and as a non-indexical two-place predicate 
in ‗The table is on your left‘ . If we opt for this view, as I think we should, then we must say the same 
thing regarding ‗notice‘ and ‗finish‘, since here too we move from an explicit use (‗I noticed the 
accident‘) to an indexical, context-dependent use (‗I noticed‘). But if we take this line, we lose the 
contrast between intransitive ‗eat‘, which denotes a property, and intransitive ‗notice‘, which denotes a 
two-place relation. 
 That objection raises delicate issues which cannot be dealt with in this paper. Let me simply say 
this: I think that, by appealing to two-dimensional semantics (Stalnaker 1999), we can reconcile the two 
views — the view that the indexical alternation characteristic of verbs like ‗notice‘ and ‗finish‘ affects 
the valence of the verb, and the view that the contrast between intransitive ‗notice‘ and intransitive ‗eat‘ 
can be drawn in terms of the number of argument-roles of the denoted relations. In two-dimensional 
semantics there are two distinct notions of content: the ‗horizontal‘ or ‗secondary‘ content on the one 
hand (content in the standard, Kaplanian sense), and the ‗diagonal‘ or ‗primary‘ content on the other 
hand. (The ‗primary/secondary‘ terminology comes from Chalmers 1996. Stalnaker uses 
‗diagonal/horizontal‘.) In this framework the secondary content of both intransitive ‗notice‘ and 
intransitive ‗eat‘ will be a property, as the variable polyadicity view suggests; yet the primary content of 
intransitive ‗notice‘ will be a two-place relation, while the primary content of intransitive ‗eat‘ will 
remain a property. 
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does require completion of the suppressed argument-role. Since completion, in this sort 
of case, is required in virtue of a linguistic convention governing the use of a particular 
lexical item, the propositional constituent contextually provided through completion is 
articulated, at some level. It is not a genuine unarticulated constituent. 
 We can imagine a context in which ‗Look! He‘s eating!‘ would be understood 
as stating not merely that the individual denoted by ‗he‘ is eating something or other, 
but that he is eating a certain salient piece of food, e.g. a dangerous mushroom which 
has been the focus of attention for some time. The eaten object would then be 
contextually provided without being linguistically required, since the intransitive verb 
only denotes the property and does not require completion. In such a case the eaten 
object would be a genuine unarticulated constituent resulting from free enrichment. But 
in the above cases of ‗argumental underdetermination‘, the contextually provided 
constituent is (weakly) articulated. Its contextual provision, therefore, is a bottom-up 
pragmatic process — a variety of saturation — rather than a top-down pragmatic 
process of free enrichment. 
 I conclude that what characterizes genuine unarticulated constituents is the fact 
that their contextual provision is not mandatory — it is not required in virtue of a 
linguistic convention governing the use of a particular construction (or class of 
constructions). In context, it may be that the unarticulated constituent is ‗required‘; but 
then it is required in virtue of features of the context, not in virtue of linguistic 
properties of the expression-type. A constituent is mandatory in the relevant sense only 
if in every context such a constituent has to be provided (precisely because the need for 
completion is not a contextual matter, but a context-independent property of the 
expression-type). This, then, is the criterion we must use when testing for (genuine) 
unarticulatedness: Can we imagine a context in which the same words are used 
normally, and a truth-evaluable statement is made, yet no such constituent is provided? 
If we can imagine such a context, then the relevant constituent is indeed unarticulated 
(in the strong sense); if we cannot, it is articulated, at some level of linguistic analysis. 
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2.3. ‗IT IS RAINING‘ 
Perry says that the contextual provision of a place is semantically mandatory for 
interpreting a weather statement like ‗It‘s raining‘. If that is right, then what I called the 
prototypical example of an unarticulated constituent is not really unarticulated (in the 
strong sense) but is the value of a hidden variable. That, indeed, is the view offered by 
Ken Taylor in defense of Minimalism (Taylor 2001). 
 Taylor states his general view (‗Parametric Minimalism‘) as follows: 
 
A sentence typically sets up a semantic scaffolding which constrains, without 
determining, its own contextual completion. The sentence does so by containing a 
variety of parameters the values of which must be contextually supplied in some 
more or less tightly constrained way. Sometimes the to-be-contextually-evaluated 
parameter is explicitly expressed in the syntax of the sentence. This is the case with 
explicit indexicals, demonstratives and also with verb tenses. Sometimes, however, 
the to-be-contextually-evaluated parameter is ―suppressed‖ or hidden. Saying just 
where such parameters hide is a difficult matter — one perhaps better left to 
linguists than to philosophers. But I venture the hypothesis that some unexpressed 
parameters hide in what we might call the subsyntactic basement of suppressed 
verbal argument structure. (Taylor 2001 : 53) 
 
The subsyntactic hypothesis applies, in particular, to ‗It‘s raining‘: 
 
The view which I favor supposes that the verb ‗to rain‘ has  a lexically specified 
argument place which is marked THEME and that this argument place takes 
places as values. This is a way of saying that the subatomic structure of the verb ‗to 
rain‘ explicitly marks rainings as a kind of change that places undergo. (...) Thus 
though: 
 
(7) It is raining 
 
is missing no syntactically mandatory sentential constituent, nonetheless, it is 
semantically incomplete. The semantic incompleteness is manifest to us as a felt 
inability to evaluate the truth value of an utterance of (7) in the absence of a 
contextually provided location (or range of locations). This felt need for a 
contextually provided location has its source, I claim, in our tacit cognition of the 
syntactically unexpressed argument place of the verb ‗to rain‘. (Taylor 2001 : 53) 
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I think such an analysis is unavoidable once we accept Perry‘s claim that, to evaluate 
(7), we need a place. Or at least, it is unavoidable if we understand that claim as 
follows: for any token u of the complete sentence ‗It is raining‘, it is necessary, in order 
to evaluate u, to be given a place. If the necessity concerns all tokens, it is a linguistic 
property of the sentence-type, hence, presumably, it arises from the internal lexical 
structure of the verb ‗to rain‘. 
 But must we really accept Perry‘s claim, thus construed? Can we not imagine a 
context in which ‗It is raining‘ would be evaluable even if no particular place were 
contextually singled out? I have no difficulty imagining such a context. I can imagine a 
situation in which rain has become extremely rare and important, and rain detectors 
have been disposed all over the territory (whatever the territory — possibly the whole 
Earth). In the imagined scenario, each detector triggers an alarm bell in the Monitoring 
Room when it detects rain. There is a single bell; the location of the triggering detector 
is indicated by a light on a board in the Monitoring Room. After weeks of total drought, 
the bell eventually rings in the Monitoring Room. Hearing it, the weatherman on duty 
in the adjacent room shouts: ‗It‘s raining!‘ His utterance is true, iff it is raining (at the 
time of utterance) in some place or other. 
 The fact that one can imagine an utterance of ‗It‘s raining‘ that is true iff it is 
raining (at the time of utterance) in some place or other arguably establishes the 
pragmatic nature of the felt necessity to single out a particular place, in the contexts in 
which such a necessity is indeed felt. If that is right, there is no need to posit a lexically 
specified argument-role for a location in the sub-atomic structure of the verb ‗rain‘: 
‗Rain‘ is like ‗dance‘ and other action verbs, contrary to what Taylor claims (2001: 54). 
That raining must take place somewhere or other is a metaphysical fact, not a linguistic 
fact. That fact does not prevent an utterance like (7) from expressing a fully determinate 
proposition even if no place is contextually provided. 
 When a particular place is contextually provided as relevant to the evaluation of 
the utterance, it is for pragmatic reasons, not because it is linguistically required. In 
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such cases, therefore, the place is a genuine unarticulated constituent. When we say 
‗It‘s raining‘ and mean: It‘s raining in Paris, the location is an unarticulated constituent 
of the statement, just as, when we say ‗Look! He is eating‘ and mean: He is eating the 
dangerous mushroom, the mushroom is an unarticulated constituent. This is very 
different from cases of ‗completion‘ where, as Taylor puts it, a sub-atomic variable 
« makes its presence felt by ‗demanding‘ to be assigned a contextually supplied 
value ». 
 
2.4. VARIADIC FUNCTIONS 
According to Perry, Taylor and most unarticulated constituency theorists, the location 
argument-role is part and parcel of the relation denoted by the verb ‗to rain‘. As 
Crimmins puts it, « what we know about rain makes it obvious that this relation must 
have as arguments at least a time and place » (1992: 17). Since the relation comprises 
this argument-role, whenever a location is contextually provided it fills that role and 
thereby finds its way into the proposition expressed by the utterance. 
 I have defended a more radical conception of (genuine) unarticulated 
constituency. According to me, a true unarticulated constituent is not even weakly 
articulated. Thus, I have argued, the relation denoted by the verb ‗to rain‘ is zero-place 
and no more involves an argument-place for a location than does the (one-place) 
relation denoted by the verb ‗to sleep‘. Of course, there can be no instance of the 
property of sleeping without there being also an instance of the more complex three-
place relation of sleeping-at-a-place-at-a-time; that, as I said, is a metaphysical fact. In 
virtue of the same fact, there can be no instance of the zero-place Rain relation without 
there being an instance of the more complex Rain-at-a-place relation. But the relation 
denoted by the verb ‗to rain‘ is the zero-place relation. It follows that the contextually 
provided location — when there is one — is unarticulated in the strong sense: it is not 
even weakly articulated via the semantics of the verb ‗to rain‘, as Taylor suggests. 
 In this framework an obvious difficulty arises, which does not arise on the 
Perry-Taylor view. If the relation itself does not come with an empty slot for a location, 
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how will the contextually provided location manage to fill a role in that relation? How 
will the location find its way into the proposition? How will the Rain relation and the 
location of rain cohere into a single proposition, if the relation does not comprise an 
empty slot in which the location can fit? This reminds us of the well-known problem of 
the unity of the proposition. 
 Something — but what? — must provide the glue for holding together the 
constituents of the proposition. That is (or was) the problem of the unity of the 
proposition. Frege‘s solution to that problem is justly famous: According to Frege, what 
provides the glue is the unsaturated nature of the relation, which comprises empty slots 
for the arguments. Now there is at least an apparent tension between that solution 
(which I accept) and the theory I have sketched. Unarticulated arguments are 
characterized by their optionality, and that means that there isn’t any ‗empty slot‘ in 
need of completion waiting for them. This raises a major difficulty for our account: If 
there is no empty slot in the relation, how will the unarticulated constituents, once 
provided, cohere with it in the proposition? What will solve the problem of the unity of 
the proposition? 
 When explicit, the location of rain is typically indicated by means of modifiers 
such as ‗in Paris‘, ‗here‘, or ‗everywhere I go‘. Such modifiers are syntactically 
optional. They make a predicate out of a predicate. If we start with a simple predicate, 
say ‗rain‘, we can make a different predicate out of it by ajoining an adverb such as 
‗heavily‘ or a prepositional phrase such as ‗in Paris‘. Thus we go from ‗It‘s raining‘ to 
‗It‘s raining heavily‘ to ‗It‘s raining heavily in Paris‘. Semantically, I suggest that we 
construe the modifier as contributing a certain sort of function which I call a variadic 
function. A variadic function is a function from relations to relations, where the output 
relation differs from the input relation only by its decreased or increased adicity. 
Adding a predicate modifier (adverb or a prepositional phrase) to a predicate expressing 
a n-ary relation Rn thus results in a complex predicate expressing an n+1-ary relation, 
in which the n+1th argument is a circumstance: a time, a location, a manner, or what 
not.  
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 A relation can be represented as a set of interconnected argument-roles, as in 
frame semantics. Thus the relation Eat contains two argument-roles : the Eater and the 
Food. The effect of an ‗expansive‘ variadic function of the sort contributed by adverbial 
modifiers is to add an argument-role. The output relation therefore contains the same 
argument-roles as the input relation, plus the extra argument-role provided by the 
variadic function. For example, in the statement ‗John eats in Paris‘ the prepositional 
phrase ‗in Paris‘ contributes a variadic function which maps the property of eating, 
ascribed to John in the simpler statement ‗John eats‘, onto the dyadic relation Eat_in (x, 
l ) between an individual and a location. That relation is predicated of the pair <John, 
Paris> in the more complex statement. Note that the prepositional phrase ‗in Paris‘ 
contributes not only the variadic function, but also the argument (Paris) which fills the 
extra argument-role.
14
 
 There are also ‗recessive‘ variadic functions that decrease the valence of the 
input relation by suppressing an argument-role.
15
 In English, various alternations such 
as the passive alternation and the intransitive alternation (Levin 1993) can be 
described in such terms. The operation of passivation (‗John kisses Mary‘  ‗Mary is 
kissed‘) suppresses the argument-role corresponding to the subject of the active 
sentence, whereas intransitivation (‗John eats the apple‘  ‗John eats‘) has the effect of 
suppressing the argument-role corresponding to the direct object of the verb. Quine‘s 
‗Der‘ operator, which I mentioned earlier, does something similar: it decreases the 
adicity of the input relation Rn by existentially quantifying the nth argument. But I 
think recessive variadic functions do not, by themselves, involve existentially 
quantifying the suppressed argument-role. Thus if we start with ‗John speaks to Mary‘, 
we can suppress the argument-role of Adressee and generate ‗John spoke‘. This does 
not entail that John spoke to someone. Whether or not the suppression of an argument-
                                                 
14 As McConnell-Ginet puts it, such phrases « have a dual role of augmenting the predicate to which 
they attach and of providing an argument for the augmented predicate » (McConnell-Ginet 1982: 171). 
15 ‗Recessive‘ comes from Lucien Tesniere, a pioneer in that area (Tesniere 1969). ‗Expansive‘ comes 
from Dowty (cited in McConnell-Ginet 1982: 168), and is also reminiscent of Bach‘s ‗expansion‘. 
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role, effected through a recessive variadic function, amounts to existentially 
quantifying that argument-role depends upon the nature of the argument-roles that 
remain unsuppressed. To fill the Speaker argument-role one need not have an 
addressee. One can speak without speaking to anyone. But to fill the Eater argument-
role, arguably, there must be something (edible) that one eats: No Eater without an 
Eatee. The suppressed argument-role therefore remains in the background via the Eater 
argument-role which, for metaphysical reasons, cannot be entirely dissociated from it. 
That is why ‗John is eating something‘ can be inferred from ‗John is eating‘. That, 
according to me, is a nonformal, ‗metaphysical‘ inference similar to that from ‗Mary is 
dancing‘ to ‗Mary is dancing somewhere‘.16 
                                                 
16 It is arguably for the same sort of reasons that the agent remains lurking in the background even after 
the Agent argument-role has been suppressed through passivation. The fact that ‗The ship was sunk 
voluntarily/to collect the insurance‘ is possible, while ‗The ship sank voluntarily/to collect the insurance‘ 
is not, is sometimes taken to show that in the passive sentence the Agent argument-role has not been 
suppressed but remains covertly present at some level of syntactic structure (Stanley forthcoming). 
Chomsky argues that the argument-role is present lexically (in the valence of the verb) even though, 
syntactically, it is not (Chomsky 1986 : 32-35). As far as I am concerned, I favour the hypothesis that the 
argument-role is metaphysically implied rather than linguistically realized. A passive sentence such as 
‗The ship was sunk‘ results from passivation of the transitive ‗sink‘, as in ‗John sank the ship‘. Now the 
ship plays two roles in (the relations described by) sentences such as ‗The ship was sunk‘ or ‗John sank 
the ship‘ : the P-role (‗patient‘ or thing acted upon), and the U-role (undergoer of change of state).  
‗John sank the ship‘ means John did something to the ship that resulted in the ship’s sinking, where the 
two tokens of ‗the ship‘ correspond to the P-role and the U-role respectively. In ‗The ship sank‘, the ship 
plays only the U-role. Now nothing can fill the P-role unless there is an agent doing something. Hence 
expressions like ‗voluntarily‘ or ‗to collect the insurance‘, which qualify the manner of acting or the goal 
of an agent, can be adjoined to sentences like ‗The ship was sunk‘, since the P-role which occurs in the 
denoted relation is metaphysically tied to the (linguistically unrealized) Agent role. In contrast, the 
expression cannot be adjoined to sentences like ‗The ship sank‘, because no action is denoted and no 
agent is even ‗lurking in the background‘. (The explanation I have just offered is very tentative, of 
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 The variadic functions that increase the valence of the input relation through the 
addition of a circumstance to the set of its argument-roles can be represented by means 
of an operator (or rather, a family of operators) ‗Circ‘. When applied to an n-place 
predicate P, ‗Circ‘ produces an n+1 place predicate (‗Circ P’). There will be as many 
Circ-operators as there are argument-roles which can be added to the set of argument-
roles of the input relation. There will be a temporal Circ-operator, a locational Circ-
operator, etc., depending on the nature of the extra argument-role. Which Circ-operator 
is at issue will be indicated by means of a subscript. For example, the operator 
‗Circlocation‘ contributed by locative modifiers (such as the prepositional phrase ‗in 
Paris‘) will map e.g. the Eat relation to the Eat_in relation by adding a Location 
argument-role: 
 
Circlocation (Eats (x)) = Eats_in (x, l) 
 
As I pointed out, a modifier such as ‗in Paris‘ does not merely increase the valence of 
the input relation by adding a new argument-role; it also provides the extra argument 
needed to fill that argument-role. ‗John eats in Paris‘ should therefore be represented as 
follows: 
 
Circlocation: Paris (Eats (John)) = Eats_in (John, Paris) 
 
Like the prepositional phrase ‗in Paris‘, the Circ-operator thus completed does two 
things: map the Eat relation to the Eat_in relation by adding a Location argument-role; 
and supply a particular value (Paris) for that role.
17
  
                                                                                                                                              
course. There may be decisive syntactic evidence that the argument-role has not really been suppressed 
through passivation. But the mere fact that ‗The ship was sunk to collect the insurance‘ is good while 
‗The ship sank to collect the insurance‘ is bad is not sufficient to establish such a conclusion, contrary to 
what Stanley suggests.) 
17 According to McConnell-Ginet, who puts forward a similar proposal, adverbs such as ‗slowly‘ do not 
contribute an argument filling the extra argument-role, but they existentially quantify the new argument-
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 Let us now go back to the problem we started with. Just as the modifier is 
syntactically optional, the circumstance it introduces is semantically optional with 
respect to the input relation. The input relation takes n arguments, and the circumstance 
is not one of them. The circumstance is contributed from outside, as it were; it is not 
demanded by the relation itself, as it would be if it filled one of the argument-roles that 
are constitutive of the relation. Still, the problem of the unity of the proposition does 
not arise. Though optional with respect to the input relation, the circumstance is not left 
free-floating in the proposition, with no slot to occupy. That is so because, by applying 
to the input relation, the variadic function generates a new relation: the output relation, 
which counts an extra argument-role. With respect to that relation, the circumstance is 
not optional. It is a genuine argument of the output relation, even if, qua circumstance, 
it is additional (hence not an argument) with respect to the input relation. To put it in a 
nutshell: there are two relations — the input relation and the output relation — hence 
the optionality of the circumstance with respect to the input relation is consistent with 
the propositional integration of the circumstance qua argument filling a slot in the 
output relation. 
 Let us apply this general solution to the rain example. As we have seen, the Rain 
relation does not involve an empty slot for a location. Thus we can say ‗It is raining‘ 
without providing a location for the rain, whether linguistically or even contextually. 
That is the lesson of the weatherman example from section 2.3. But if we do provide a 
location, either through the adjunction of a prepositional phrase or by purely contextual 
means, we thereby generate a new relation, in which there is an empty slot, an 
argument-role which the location fills. Since there is an argument place for the location 
in the output relation (though not in the input relation), the location finds its way into 
the proposition and coheres with the other constituents. This is consistent with the 
                                                                                                                                              
role while contributing a property of its values (McConnell-Ginet 1982). If we accept McConnell-Ginet‘s 
idea, ‗John eats slowly‘ will be analysed as follows: 
Circrate: slow (Eats (John)) = (r ) (Slow (r) & Eats_at_rate (John, r) 
That is, there is a rate r which is slow, such that John eats at that rate. 
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optionality of the location with respect to the input relation — the relation to which, 
implicitly or explicitly, the variadic function applies.
18
 
 
3. THE ARGUMENT FROM BINDING: A REFUTATION 
 
3.1. THE BINDING CRITERION 
I have argued that, whenever a contextually provided constituent is unarticulated (in the 
strong sense), we can imagine contexts in which the lack of such a constituent would 
not prevent the sentence from expressing a complete proposition. This gives us a 
criterion — the Optionality Criterion — for determining when a contextually provided 
constituent is truly unarticulated and when it is not. 
 
Optionality Criterion 
                                                 
18 The view I have sketched escapes the difficulties that beset the traditional ‗argument analysis‘ of 
adverbs. The problem with treating what adverbs contribute as further arguments of the relation 
expressed by the verb is that this assumes something patently untrue: that « the number and identity of 
adverbial arguments for a given predicate can be exactly specified », and that such information « must be 
regarded as implicit even when it is not overtly expressed » (Larson and Segal 1995: 468). As adverbs 
and modifiers can always be multiplied, and new dimensions of modification can always emerge, the 
standard argument analysis is clearly hopeless. But the view I have sketched meets both objections: the 
number and identity of adverbial arguments do not have to be specified in advance, and whatever 
information they convey does not have to be regarded as implicit when they are not provided (whether 
linguistically or contextually). For they are arguments only in the output relation. They are not arguments 
in the input relation, hence they don‘t have to be specified at that level, that is, in the semantics of the 
verb. 
 Another objection to the standard ‗argument analysis‘ is that, contrary to the ‗event analysis‘ put 
forward by Davidson, it does not account for systematic inferences from e.g. ‗John talked rapidly‘ to 
‗John talked‘. But the present view has no trouble accounting for such inferences  (see the appendix at 
the end of this paper). 
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Whenever a contextually provided constituent is (truly) unarticulated, we can imagine 
another possible context of utterance in which the contextual provision of such a 
constituent would not be necessary for the utterance to express a complete proposition. 
 
Using that criterion, I have established that the contextually provided location (when 
there is one) is a genuine unarticulated constituent of the statement that it is raining, 
precisely because it is optional. There are contexts in which the sentence ‗It is raining‘ 
expresses a complete proposition even though no location is contextually provided as 
that which the utterance concerns. 
 This result conflicts with what we get when we apply another criterion: the 
Binding Criterion, which Stanley uses in his paper. 
 
Binding Criterion 
A contextually provided constituent in the interpretation of a sentence S is articulated 
whenever the argument-role it fills can be intuitively ‗bound‘, that is, whenever what 
fills that role can be made to vary with the values introduced by some operator prefixed 
to S. 
 
For binding to occur, Stanley argues, there must be a bindable variable in the sentence 
to which the operator is prefixed; but if there is such a variable, representing the 
argument-role to be filled, then the contextually provided constituent which fills it is 
articulated — it is the (contextual) value of the variable. 
 The conflict arises because the location of rain, which is a genuine unarticulated 
constituent in virtue of the Optionality Criterion, turns out to be articulated in virtue of 
the Binding Criterion. We can say: 
 
(8) Wherever I go, it rains 
 
In such a statement the place where it rains can be undertood as varying with the places 
introduced by the quantifier ‗wherever I go‘. On the most natural interpretation the 
statement means that: 
 
For every location l such that I go to l, it rains in l (when I am there) 
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For such binding to occur, Stanley says, there must be a free variable l in the sentence 
‗it rains‘. That variable can either be bound (as in (8)), or be contextually given a value 
(as in (7)). Whatever location may be contextually provided for the rain is therefore not 
a genuine unarticulated constituent, but the contextual value of a free variable in logical 
form. 
 The major problem I see with Stanley‘s argument against unarticulated 
constituents is that it works too well. It obliges us to treat as articulated not only 
contextual elements which can plausibly be regarded as values of variables in sub-
atomic structure, as well as elements for which at least the question arises, but also 
many contextual elements for which that sort of treatment is simply out of question. 
This is a serious weakness which should lead one to doubt the reliability of the Binding 
Criterion. 
 Let us start with an unproblematic case, in which the Binding Criterion works 
smoothly. We can, as Partee (1989) pointed out, bind the ‗object‘ argument-role of 
‗notice‘ even though it is unarticulated in surface syntax: 
 
Every secretary made a mistake in his final draft. The good secretary corrected his 
mistake. Every other secretary did not even notice. 
 
Applying the Binding Criterion, we conclude that the suppressed argument-role is still 
represented in logical form by a free variable. It follows that, when we say ‗I noticed‘, 
the contextually provided object is articulated, appearances notwithstanding. This is 
OK, for there are reasons to believe that the object of ‗notice‘ is indeed represented by a 
free variable in sub-atomic structure. But the Binding Criterion delivers the same 
verdict in indefinitely many cases in which the unarticulated nature of the constituent 
seems pretty well established. Let me give two striking examples. 
 The first example is adapted from David Rumelhart (1979: 78):  
 
The policeman stopped the car 
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In interpreting this utterance we make certain assumptions concerning the way the car 
was stopped by the policeman. On the most natural interpretation we assume that the 
policeman issued appropriate signals to the driver, who stopped the car accordingly. 
But if we know, or suppose, that the policeman was actually driving the car in the 
reported scene, we will understand his stopping of the car very differently from the way 
we understand it when we assume that he was regulating the traffic. Quite different 
‗manners of stopping‘ are involved in the two cases. Those implied manners of 
stopping are part of the way we understand the utterance but they are additional aspects 
of the interpretation, linguistically optional hence external to what is said by minimalist 
standards. What is said in the minimal sense is only that the policeman stopped the car 
in some way or other. The specific manner of stopping is provided through ‗free 
enrichment‘. 
 Here, as in the case of ‗It‘s raining‘, the Optionality Criterion tells us that the 
contextually provided manner of stopping is unarticulated. For we have no trouble 
imagining a context in which no such manner of stopping would be contextually 
specified. Moreover, in contrast to the ‗rain‘ case, there is a wide consensus among 
theorists that the contextually provided manner of stopping in such an example is a 
pragmatic embellishment of the interpretation which is of no more concern to semantics 
than our tendency, as interpreters, to imagine the policeman dressed in a certain way. 
Indeed I think that everybody, including Stanley, would agree that in the policeman 
case the contextually provided constituent is pragmatic through and through. It is not 
part of the proposition literally expressed in the minimalist sense (what is saidmin). Yet 
the argument from binding shows that, even in that case, the contextually provided 
constituent is linguistically articulated. For we can say things like 
 
However he did it, the policeman stopped the car 
In some way or other, the policeman stopped the car 
 
meaning: 
 
For some manner of stopping m, the policeman stopped the car in manner m. 
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If we apply the Binding Criterion, we shall have to conclude that the contextually 
provided manner of stopping is articulated and determined through a bottom-up process 
of saturation, like the reference of indexicals. The absurdity of this conclusion argues 
against the Binding Criterion. 
 The other example is even more striking. Remember the utterance: ‗Look! He is 
eating!‘ We imagined a context in which a salient mushroom was understood as being 
the thing eaten. That the contextually provided constituent is unarticulated and results 
from free enrichment follows from the fact that intransitive ‗eat‘, as Stanley himself 
accepts (p. 401, fn. 14), denotes the property of eating1. No contextual specification of 
the thing eaten is required in virtue of the semantics of the verb. Still, intuitively, 
binding is possible. We can say: 
 
John is anorexic, but whenever his father cooks mushrooms, he eats. 
 
On a natural interpretation, we understand that John eats the mushrooms his father has 
cooked. Intuitively, a form of binding is operative here; for the food eaten by John 
covaries with the food cooked by his father. Such examples show that intuitive binding, 
per se, does not entail articulatedness. The Binding Criterion, on which Stanley‘s 
argument rests, must be rejected. 
 
3.2. EXISTENTIAL CLOSURE BY DEFAULT? 
We have seen that, sometimes, a contextually provided constituent is optional, even 
though the argument-role it fills is bindable. Its being optional suggests that there is no 
free variable in logical form; for if there were one, completion would be required 
whenever the variable is left unbound. For example, there are contexts in which the 
simple sentence ‗It is raining‘ (with no operator in front to bind the alleged variable) is 
interpreted as It’s raining in some place or other. If there were a free variable in logical 
form, completion would be required and a definite location would have to be assigned 
to the variable in the course of truth-conditional interpretation. That fact argue against 
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the Binding Criterion, according to which bindability entails articulatedness. 
 In defense of the Binding Criterion, one could argue as follows. Who said that, 
whenever there is a free variable, completion was required? Following Partee and 
others (e.g. Nunberg 1992), we have noticed that there were two sorts of ‗free 
variables‘ associated with indexicals and other context-sensitive expressions: those that 
are bindable and those that are not. The indexical ‗here‘ acts as a free variable for a 
location (a location that has to be ‗proximal‘, even if it need not be the place where the 
speaker is); but that variable is unbindable — its value can only be contextually 
provided. In contrast, ‗there‘ also acts as a free variable for a location, but that variable 
is bindable. (I can say: ‗Whenever I go and visit my father‘s new home, my brother is 
already there‘, on a bound reading in which my father‘s home keeps changing. I cannot 
say to my father: ‗Whenever I come and visit you in your new home, my brother is 
already here‘, on a similarly ‗bound‘ reading of ‗here‘.) However we account for this 
distinction, it is an empirical fact that there are these two sorts of variable. Now, why 
not accept that there is another distinction, among bindable variables, between those 
which require completion when unbound, and those which do not? On this view, there 
are free variables in logical form which can be bound (as the location variable can, in 
‗It is raining‘) but which do not require completion when left unbound.19 Such a free 
variable — let us call it an optional variable — can either be assigned a contextual 
value, or, if no value is contextually provided, undergo ECBD (existential closure by 
default). On this view it is the Optionality Criterion which must be given up, not the 
Binding Criterion. The fact that completion is optional in the alleged counterexamples 
to the Binding Criterion does not entail that the contextually provided constituent is 
unarticulated; all that fact shows is that, if articulated, the constituent in question is 
articulated by an optional variable, i.e. a variable susceptible to ECBD. 
 On the view I have just sketched, all the cases I have classified so far as genuine 
unarticulated constituents would turn out to be constituents articulated by an optional 
                                                 
19 Barwise (1989: 241 fn) speaks of « relations with optional arguments ». Perhaps that is what he meant 
(though his example suggests otherwise). 
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variable. For example, intransitive ‗eat‘ would not longer be said to denote the property 
of eating1, but the relation of eating2. That relation, the ECBD theorist would argue, 
involves an argument-role for the Food, represented by a free variable in logical form. 
But that variable belongs to the optional variety. ‗He is eating‘ can thus be understood 
either with respect to a contextually provided object (e.g. the mushroom in the ‗Look! 
He is eating‘ example) or via ECBD as saying that the individual referred to by ‗he‘ is 
eating something or other. The Food argument-role can also be bound by an explicit 
quantifier, as we have seen (‗Whenever his father cooks mushrooms, John eats‘). Even 
the Rumelhart example could be handled by saying, in the manner of Taylor, that all 
verbs of action carry a ‗manner‘ variable that is optional, that is, may or may not be 
contextually given a specific value when unbound. 
 For that option to be worth pursuing, we must give it some initial plausibility by 
showing that there are clear cases of the phenomenon on the articulated side. In other 
words, we must find context-sensitive expressions which can not only be bound by an 
operator, but which can also be implicitly bound via ECBD. That is not such an easy 
thing to do. The third person pronoun ‗he‘, which can be bound, cannot be bound 
implicitly via ECBD. There is no reading of ‗He is bald‘ where that means that some 
male or other is bald. Nor can ‗John is home‘ mean that John is at someone or other‘s 
home. (Yet ‗home‘ can easily be bound by e.g. a quantifier: ‗Everybody went home‘.) 
Binding by default does not seem to occur with overt context-sensitive expressions. 
Why, then, should it occur with covert context-sensitive expressions? That is one of the 
questions which have to be answered by anyone willing to explore the ECBD option.
20
 
 I will not say more about the ECBD option in this paper. Whatever attraction it 
has is due mainly to the support it receives from Stanley‘s argument. According to the 
                                                 
20 As one of the referees pointed out, the ECBD theorist can argue that event variables of the sort posited 
in Davidsonian analyses are bound by default existential closure. (See e.g. Higginbotham 1985.) But 
event variables themselves are covert variables, hence the fact that they undergo ECBD should cast 
doubt on them too, in virtue of the argument stated in the text. (See the appendix for an alternative to 
Davidsonian analyses.) 
 
38 
argument, there cannot be binding without a bindable variable, hence the bindability of 
an argument-role shows that the contextually provided constituent filling that role is 
articulated by a free variable in logical form. If one finds Stanley‘s argument 
convincing, one is thereby led to accept the package Binding Criterion plus ECBD 
(since ECBD is the only way to account for the optionality of the relevant constituents 
consistently with the Binding Criterion). But I do not find Stanley‘s argument 
convincing — I think it rests on a fallacy, which I am now going to expose. 
 
3.3. THE BINDING FALLACY 
In ‗Everywhere I go, it rains‘ a variable is bound by the quantifier ‗everywhere I go‘. 
The sentence says that, for every place l such that I go to l, it rains in l. Stanley 
concludes that, when ‗It rains‘ is understood with respect to a contextually provided 
location, that location is articulated after all. The sentence ‗It rains‘ really is the 
sentence ‗It rains in 1’, where the unpronounced location variable can either be bound 
or be contextually assigned a value. Fully spelled out, Stanley‘s argument against 
unarticulated constituents runs as follows: 
 
1. Unarticulated constituent theorists say that in the simple statement ‗It rains‘, the 
location of rain is unarticulated. 
2. In ‗Everywhere I go it rains‘, binding occurs: the location of rain varies with the 
values introduced by the quantifier ‗everywhere I go‘.  
3. There is no binding without a bindable variable. 
4. Therefore, ‗It rains‘ involves a variable for the location of rain. 
5. It follows that the unarticulated constituent theorist is mistaken: in the simple 
statement ‗It rains‘, the location of rain is articulated. It is the (contextually assigned) 
value of a free variable in logical form, which variable can also be bound (as in the 
complex sentence ‗Everywhere I go, it rains‘). 
 
The argument is fallacious because of a crucial ambiguity at stage 4. When it is said 
that ‗It rains‘ involves a variable (because binding occurs), which sentence ‗It rains‘ is 
at issue? One may well accept that in the complex sentence ‗Everywhere I go it rains‘, 
the (open) sentence on which the restricted quantifier operates involves a location 
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variable which the quantifier binds: ‗For every place l such that I go to l, it rains in l’. 
That indeed follows from step 3. But in order to reach the conclusion at step 5, we need 
something stronger: 4 must be understood as claiming that the location variable is also 
involved when the sentence ‘It rains’ is uttered in isolation. Stanley‘s argument 
therefore relies upon an unstated premiss, namely the following: 
 
(SUP) In ‗Everywhere I go it rains‘, the sentence on which the quantifier ‗everywhere I 
go‘ operates is the very sentence ‗It rains‘ which can also be uttered in isolation (and 
whose usual interpretation is said by some to involve an unarticulated location 
constituent). 
 
If we accept (SUP) it follows that the variable which is bound in the complex sentence 
has got to be present also, unbound, in the simple sentence ‗It rains‘. Whoever accepts 
the analysis of adverbial modification in terms of variadic functions must reject (SUP), 
however. 
 According to the variadic analysis, the phrase ‗everywhere I go‘ does not merely 
contribute what binds the variable, it also contributes the variable itself, i.e. the extra 
argument-role for a location. The phrase ‗everywhere I go‘ has a dual role exactly like 
that of any prepositional phrase. Consider ‗in Paris‘. In ‗In Paris it rains‘, the 
prepositional phrase ‗in Paris‘ contributes both (a) a variadic function which adds an 
extra argument-role to the set of argument-roles of the input predicate ‗rain‘, and (b) an 
argument which fills the role. This duality is quite transparent since the prepositional 
phrase consists of two items: a preposition which determines the type of the extra 
argument-role, and a name which specifies what fills the role. When the prepositional 
phrase is an ‗intransitive preposition‘ like ‗here‘, it is less obvious that it plays two 
semantic roles, but it does so nonetheless. In ‗It rains here‘, the locative adverb ‗here‘ 
contributes a variadic function which increases the valence of the expressed relation, 
and it also contributes a specific location which fills the extra argument-role. We find 
the same duality when the phrase is quantificational instead of being singular. In 
‗Everywhere I go, it rains‘, the phrase ‗everywhere I go‘ contributes both the adicity-
increasing variadic function and the operator which binds the extra argument-role. 
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From the point of view of the variadic analysis, therefore, the proper representation of 
‗Everywhere I go it rains‘ is: 
 
[For every place l such that I go to l ] (in l  (it rains)) 
 
What the quantifier operates on here is the subformula ‗in l (it rains)‘, whose free 
variable it binds. In that subformula we do find a variable for a location. The simple 
sentence ‗It rains‘ does not correspond to that subformula, however, but to the sub-
subformula ‗it rains‘, which does not contain a free variable for a location. Stanley‘s 
argument goes through only if we conflate two different things: the open sentence on 
which the quantifier operates, and the simple sentence ‗It rains‘ to which the phrase 
‗everywhere I go‘ has been adjoined. On the variadic analysis, they are clearly 
distinguished. 
 
4. ‘BOUND’ UNARTICULATED CONSTITUENTS 
 
4.1. THE WEAK BINDING CRITERION 
When a circumstance is explicitly provided, by means of an adverbial adjunct, a 
variadic function operates on the input relation expressed by the nuclear predicate, 
outputting a complex relation with higher adicity. The same thing happens when a 
circumstance is contextually provided, except that the variadic function which applies 
to the input relation remains unarticulated. It is important to realize that (on the present 
account) what is unarticulated is not merely the argument which fills the new argument-
role (say, Location) but the argument-role as well. The unarticulated constituent 
corresponds to what would be articulated if a prepositional phrase had been uttered. So 
the proper analysis of ‗it‘s raining‘, when the location Paris is an unarticulated 
constituent of the interpretation, is 
 
<In Paris> (it rains) 
 
where the prepositional phrase ‗in Paris‘ stands for a locative operator CIRClocation: 
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Paris, and the angle brackets indicate that the operator in question remains 
unarticulated. 
 Beside the articulated/unarticulated distinction, there is another important 
distinction between cases in which the contextually or explicitly provided circumstance 
is constant and cases in which it is variable and depends upon the values introduced by 
some quantifier in the sentence. On the articulated side, that is the difference between: 
‗In Paris it is raining‘ (constant location) and ‗In every city I know it is raining‘ 
(variable location). The latter I represent as 
 
[For every city x such that I know x] (in x (it rains)) 
 
Here, as we saw in the previous section, the quantified prepositional phrase (QPP) 
contributes both the variadic function ‗in x‘ which creates an extra argument-role and 
the quantifier ‗for every city x such that I know x‘ which binds it. 
 In this particular example the variable location is articulated by the QPP. Could 
it be unarticulated? That is, is it possible for a circumstance to be both variable and 
unarticulated at the same time? Stanley claims that it is not. To say that a circumstance 
filling a certain argument-role varies with the values introduced by some quantifier in 
the sentence is to say that there is a free variable, representing the argument-role, which 
is bound by that quantifier. Now if there is a variable in logical form representing the 
argument-role, then the argument-role is articulated. So the reasoning goes. The natural 
conclusion is that only constant circumstances can be unarticulated. 
 The piece of reasoning I have just reconstructed is different from the ‗argument 
from binding‘ discussed (and refuted) in part 3; for that argument was meant to show 
that there are no unarticulated circumstances at all, whether constant or variable. The 
argument from binding discussed in part 3 was offered in justification of the Binding 
Criterion, according to which bindability — not actual binding — entails 
articulatedness:  
 
Binding Criterion 
If an argument-role is bindable, that is, if what fills it can be made to vary by prefixing 
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a quantifier to the sentence, then that argument-role is articulated even in the simple 
sentence (without the quantifier). 
 
Stanley used that criterion in attempting to establish that, in examples like ‗It rains‘, the 
contextually provided location is not a genuine unarticulated constituent, but results 
from contextually assigning a value to a free variable. (Indeed, the location can be made 
to vary by prefixing the quantifier ‗everywhere I go‘ to the sentence.) That attempt 
fails, as we have seen; and it fails because the Binding Criterion rests on a fallacy. The 
construction ‗rain + locative prepositional phrase‘ expresses a relation in which there is 
indeed an empty argument-slot for a location. When the prepositional phrase is 
quantified, as in ‗Everywhere I go it rains‘, the variable representing that empty slot is 
indeed bound. But in the simple construction, without prepositional phrase, there is 
neither an empty argument-slot for a location nor a free variable. That is so because the 
QPP does more than bind the variable; it also contributes the variadic function ‗in l’ 
which maps the relation ‗rain‘ to ‗rain_in_l’. If we disregard the prepositional phrase 
and abstract from its contribution, we suppress the variadic function and the free 
variable that goes with it. It follows that bindability does not entail articulatedness; only 
actual binding entails articulatedness. Hence the Binding Criterion must be rejected, 
and a weaker criterion adopted instead:  
 
Weak Binding Criterion: 
If an argument-role is actually bound by a quantifier in the sentence, that is, if what fills 
the role depends upon the values introduced by that quantifier, then (in that sentence) 
the argument-role is articulated by a variable which the quantifier binds. 
 
That Criterion establishes that variable circumstances cannot be unarticulated. But it 
says nothing about constant circumstances — the sort of circumstance that features in 
standard examples of unarticulated constituent. 
 Contrary to the Binding Criterion, the Weak Binding Criterion does not rest on a 
fallacy. Yet it, too, conflicts with the Optionality Criterion. This we can see by looking 
at some of Stanley‘s examples in which, he claims, binding actually occurs. Many of 
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these examples are such that the circumstance they involve, though variable, has to be 
classified as unarticulated in virtue of the Optionality Criterion. 
 
4.2. INDIRECT BINDING VIA UNARTICULATED FUNCTIONS 
As Stanley points out, we can say 
 
(9) Every time John lights a cigarette, it rains 
 
meaning: 
 
For every time t at which John lights a cigarette, it rains at t at the location in which 
John lights a cigarette at t 
 
On this ‗bound‘ reading the location of rain varies with the places in which the event of 
John‘s lighting of a cigarette occurs. To capture that reading, as well as the ordinary 
reading of ‗It rains‘ (understood with respect to a contextually provided location), 
Stanley says we must postulate a variable in logical form, which can be either bound or 
free. With an unarticulated constituent analysis, he claims, there is no way to account 
for the bound reading. Is that true? Let us try. 
 Instead of saying that there is a variable in the logical form of the sentence, 
which can either be bound (as in 9) or be assigned a contextual value (as in (7)), we can 
say that in the interpretation of both (9) and (7) there is an unarticulated constituent. In 
(7) the unarticulated constituent is a specific location provided by the context. In (9) the 
unarticulated constituent is a function from times (or from events) to locations — a 
function which determines a location only with respect to a time (or possibly an event) 
serving as argument to the function. The difference between the ordinary interpretation 
of ‗It rains‘ in (7) and its interpretation in sentence (9) can be represented as follows: 
 
Interpretation of ‘It rains’ in (7) 
<here/in Paris> (it rains) 
 
Interpretation of ‘It rains’ in (9): 
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<in location f(t) > (it rains) 
 
 That the the variable location is unarticulated in (9) can be established by means 
of the Optionality Criterion. Just as the simple sentence ‗It is raining‘ can be interpreted 
as meaning It is raining in some place or other, without any location being contextually 
provided, the complex sentence (9) can be understood as meaning Whenever John 
lights a cigarette, it rains in some place or other. Neither a specific location nor even a 
function from times or anything else to locations needs to be provided. When either is 
provided, it is for pragmatic reasons — in order to make sense of the utterance. Nothing 
in the sentence itself triggers the contextual provision of either a specific location or a 
function taking locations as values. 
 It is surprising that Stanley did not think of this theoretical option, since he 
himself considers that the variable occurring in the logical form of the sentence ‗It‘s 
raining‘ is not simply a locational variable, but a higher-level function variable f(x) 
taking a first-order variable as argument. In some contexts, Stanley says, ‗x‘ will be 
given a location (say, Paris) as value and ‗f‘ the identity function as value. Under those 
contextual assignments, ‗It is raining‘ will express the proposition that it is raining in 
Paris. In a different context, ‗x‘ will be an event, say today‘s concert, and ‗f‘ a function 
from events to the places where the events occur. In such a context ‗It rains‘ says that it 
rains at the place of the concert. Since he accepts that a function is contextually 
provided in such cases and assigned to the higher-level variable, why not consider the 
possibility that such a function can also be contextually provided without being 
triggered by a higher-level function variable in logical form? Why not indeed? Once 
this option is considered, it is pretty obvious that it is to be preferred to Stanley‘s own 
view, according to which the contextually provided function is articulated by a higher-
level variable. For Stanley‘s view cannot account for the optional character of the 
contextual provision, while the alternative view can. 
 Note that the function which bridges the gap between the quantifier and the 
indirectly bound argument-role (the ‗bridging function‘, for short) need not be 
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unarticulated; it can also be articulated: 
 
Every time I sing, it rains at the very place where I happen to sing. 
 
Here there is a prepositional phrase which does not provide a specific location, but a 
variable location which is a function of the time (or event) of singing. This suggests that 
‗Every time I sing, it rains‘ can itself be analysed along the following lines:  
 
[For every t such that I sing at t] (at t (<in l: I sing in l at t> (it rains))) 
 
The description within angle brackets provides a function from times to locations, 
through which the quantifier over times indirectly binds the location argument-role. 
 In this framework examples like (9) involve not one, but two unarticulated 
constituents. First, the variadic function which introduces an extra argument-role for a 
location l is as unarticulated in this example as it is in ‗It is raining‘ when understood 
with respect to a contextually provided constant location. True, the QPP ‗Every time 
John lights a cigarette‘ explicitly contributes (hence articulates) a variadic function, but 
it is a different one — one that introduces an argument place for a temporal 
circumstance. There are two variadic functions at work in (9), one locational and the 
other temporal (‗at t‘). The temporal one is articulated, the locational one unarticulated. 
Second, what fills the extra argument-role introduced by the unarticulated variadic 
function is a variable location determined by another unarticulated function, from times 
to locations. 
 So far, so good. But there is a difficulty in store for the unarticulated constituent 
theorist (i.e. for myself). It is apparent in the formulas I have used to represent the 
unarticulated constituent. I have written ‗<in location f(t)>‘, where the angle brackets 
indicate the unarticulated nature of the constituent. Within the angle brackets we find 
the variable ‗t‘, which is bound by the quantifier outside the angle brackets. This is 
necessary to get the desired, bound reading. But how can a bound variable figure within 
an unarticulated constituent? A variable has got to be articulated. There is no sense in 
talking of ‗unarticulated variables‘, for variables are linguistic expressions; they belong 
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to the language, not to the reality to which the language corresponds. They are not like 
objects, functions, and the like, which are part of the world and to which semantic 
conventions map the expressions of the language. Worldly entities can be articulated or 
not, depending on whether or not they are contributed by linguistic expressions. But for 
linguistic expressions themselves, there is no possibility of unarticulatedness. This, 
then, is the real problem which ‗bound‘ readings raise for the unarticulated constituent 
theorist: In order to capture them, it seems that we must posit a bound variable; but 
doing so is inconsistent with the presumptive unarticulatedness of the constituent. 
 
4.3. ‗WH+EVER‘-PHRASES 
The problem I have just mentioned arises in all the cases in which a variable 
circumstance seems to be unarticulated (i.e. when it passes the Optionality test). In 
section 4.2. we considered examples in which an unarticulated function bridges the gap 
between the quantifier and the unarticulated argument-role which it indirectly binds. In 
this section I will consider simpler examples in which no unarticulated bridging 
function is involved — examples such as: 
 
(8) Wherever I go, it rains. 
 
Here the phrase ‗wherever I go‘ directly quantifies over locations, hence no 
unarticulated function is needed to bridge the gap between the quantifier and the extra 
argument-role for a location. Still, I want to maintain, that argument-role is 
unarticulated in (8). This can be established by means of the Optionality Criterion. 
 I take it as obvious that, in an appropriate context, we could interpret sentence 
(8) as saying that  
 
Wherever I go, it rains in some place or other 
 
I leave it as an exercise to the reader to imagine a context in which this interpretation of 
(8) would be appropriate. What matters is that this interpretation is not forbidden on 
purely linguistic grounds. In this respect there is a big difference between (8) and 
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(10) Everywhere I go, it rains 
 
for that sentence cannot be interpreted as saying that everywhere I go, it rains in some 
place or other. That interpretation of sentence (10) is simply not available — indeed we 
cannot even make sense of it. In (10), the location of rain is linguistically determined — 
it has got to be the place where I go. 
 At this point it must be noticed that (8) is actually ambiguous. Syntactically, (8) 
can be given two different analyses. On one analysis (8) is more or less equivalent to 
(10), and it does not tolerate the ‗neutral‘ (‗in some place or other‘) interpretation. That 
reading on which (8) is equivalent to (10) can be forced by suppressing ‗ever‘: 
 
(8a) Where I go, it rains 
 
This can only be understood as meaning that it rains at the place where I go. On that 
reading (8) presumably results from a process of extraction with a trace left behind: 
 
[Wherever I go]i [it rains ti] 
 
The proper semantic analysis of (8), on that reading, is 
 
For every l such that I go to l, it rains in l 
 
But there is another reading of (8) — that which I want to focus on. On that reading the 
sentence-initial ‗wherever I go‘ is base-generated in that position; it does not result 
from a process of extraction. There is no syntactic variable for a location in that case — 
no trace left by the movement of the wh-phrase (since no movement takes place). 
Syntactically, the sentence is to be analysed simply as: 
 
[Wherever I go] [it rains] 
 
Semantically, the proper analysis is 
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For all l, if I go to l, it rains 
 
What characterizes this reading of (8) is that the location of rain is not linguistically 
encoded. As a result, ‗wherever I go, it rains‘ (on that reading) can be understood as 
meaning: ‗wherever I go, it rains in some place or other‘, in some appropriate context. 
 Since, on this reading (henceforth the ‗base-generated‘ reading), the sentence 
itself says nothing of the location of rain, it is always possible to add a prepositional 
phrase contributing that piece of information. Thus we can say: 
 
(8b) Wherever I go, it rains here/in Paris/in all the alternative places I might have 
visited instead of that which I eventually chose 
 
The contribution which the added locative phrase, e.g. ‗here‘, makes in (8b) can also 
result from a process of free enrichment. Just as we can understand ‗It‘s raining‘ to 
mean It’s raining <here>, we can understand ‗Wherever I go, it rains‘ (on the base-
generated reading) to mean: 
 
Wherever I go, it rains <here> 
 
In such cases the contextually provided circumstance is unarticulated. 
 A special case is that in which the base-generated reading of (8) is enriched with 
an unarticulated location which coincides with the location mentioned in the 
‘wherever’-clause: 
 
Wherever I go, it rains <there/in the place where I go> 
 
This is certainly the most natural — the most salient — interpretation for sentence (8) 
on the base-generated reading. The speaker who says ‗wherever I go, it rains‘ is likely 
to mean that it rains in the place where he goes (whatever it is). Truth-conditionally, 
this is equivalent to the first reading of (8): that in which there is extraction and a trace 
left behind. We analysed the first reading as 
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For all l such that I go to l, it rains in l 
 
What we have just seen is that the same truth-conditions can be determined by giving 
(8) the second, base-generated analysis and adding an unarticulated constituent: 
 
For all l, if I go to l, it rains <there/where I go> 
 
 A similar example, a variant of which I mentioned earlier, is 
 
Whatever his father cooks, John eats 
 
which is also syntactically ambigous. One one reading ‗Whatever his father cooks‘ is 
base-generated in the sentence initial position, and ‗eat‘ is intransitive: 
 
[Whatever his father cooks] [John eats] 
 
On the other reading the verb is transitive and there is extraction of the object out of the 
VP, with a trace left behind: 
 
[Whatever his father cooks](i) [John eats t(i)] 
 
When there is no trace, an object filling the Food argument-role can still be 
contextually provided, but then it is unarticulated. Thus ‗whatever his father cooks, 
John eats‘ (with intransitive ‗eat‘) can be understood, inter alia, as meaning that he eats 
the things cooked by his father. That interpretation results from a process of free 
enrichment: an unarticulated variadic function maps the property of eating1, expressed 
by intransitive ‗eat‘, on the relation of eating2 and the extra argument-role thus 
provided is filled by the values introduced by the quantifier. 
 In such cases the Optionality Criterion converges with syntactic analysis to 
suggest that there is an unarticulated constituent in the interpretation of the utterance. 
Yet, intuitively, binding occurs: the thing eaten covaries with the thing cooked, or the 
location of the rain covaries with the destination of the travel. To capture that 
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covariation it seems that we must posit a bound variable within the unarticulated 
constituent. This raises a problem, as we have seen. 
 
4.4. FREE ENRICHMENT : THE ‗SYNTACTIC‘ CONCEPTION 
In the two sorts of case I have discussed (those which involve bridging functions, and 
those which involve base-generated ‗wh+ever‘-phrases in sentence-initial position) 
there is, I think, enough evidence that some constituent in the interpretation of the 
utterance is unarticulated; yet the unarticulated constituent in question is variable rather 
than constant — it varies with the values introduced by a quantifier in the sentence. 
Stanley is right that there is a tension between the two sides of the phenomenon — 
variability and unarticulatedness — but I don‘t think that forces us to give up on 
unarticulatedness. There are two possible solutions for the unarticulated constituent 
theorist confronted with the problematic cases. 
The first solution consists in denying that a bound variable is really involved, in 
those examples. There are different ways to implement this strategy. One may appeal to 
a variable-free framework (e.g. Cresswell 1996, Jacobson 1999) and argue that the 
unarticulated constituent, in the relevant examples, is a healthy model-theoretic object 
of the sort posited in such frameworks to do the work of variables. Or, in the same spirit 
but in a standard framework, one may ascribe semantic elements to bound variables as 
their worldly counterparts, and argue that such elements can stand unarticulated.
21
  In 
an earlier version of this paper I mentioned yet another option, based upon a new 
approach to unbound anaphora which I hope to pursue elsewhere. 
The other solution consists in biting the bullet. Let us concede that ‗bound‘ 
unarticulated constituents involve bound variables and are therefore articulated to some 
extent. What follows? Not much, I think. Though articulated in a certain sense, such 
constituents can still said to be unarticulated in another sense and to result from ‗free 
enrichment‘. 
 So far free enrichment has been construed as a mechanism through which some 
                                                 
21 Stanley credits Jeff King for emphasizing the second option out to him. 
 
51 
constituent in the truth-conditional interpretation of an utterance is contextually 
supplied without being articulated in the sentence. This is the ‗semantic‘ interpretation 
of free enrichment. But there is another, ‗syntactic‘ interpretation. According to the 
syntactic conception, what free enrichment yields is not (some aspect of) the truth-
conditional interpretation of an utterance, but rather a more elaborate representation 
which will eventually be given a truth-conditional interpretation. 
 Let a ‗representation‘ be a sequence of symbols in some 
linguistic/representational medium, and the ‗interpretation‘ of a representation be some 
worldly entity or complex of entities to which the representation corresponds — which 
it represents. Then, on the semantic conception, free enrichment determines aspects of 
the interpretation of a given representation, aspects which are unarticulated in the sense 
that nothing in the representation corresponds to them. On the syntactic conception, free 
enrichment determines aspects of the representation which is interpreted: it contributes 
further symbols, further representational elements, which are unarticulated in the sense 
that nothing corresponds to them in the natural language sentence that has been uttered. 
The output of this process of free enrichment in the syntactic sense is a mental 
representation which articulates what the speaker means by his utterance, including 
those aspects of the speaker‘s message that are not articulated in the natural language 
sentence she uses. 
 On the syntactic conception, free enrichment is still free: nothing in the natural 
language sentence triggers that process, which takes place as part of an attempt to make 
sense of the utterance. But what the process delivers is unarticulated only in the sense 
that nothing in the natural language sentence encodes that element. It is unarticulated in 
the sense of not being articulated in the natural language sentence. Still the element in 
question may be ‗linguistic‘: it is a constituent in a (mental) representation, not a 
constituent in a state of affairs represented by a representation. Since the unarticulated 
constituent can be linguistic, it can be a bound variable. On the syntactic conception, 
therefore, the phrase ‗bound unarticulated constituent‘ is no longer an oxymoron 
requiring the use of scare quotes. Bound variables can be truly unarticulated if free 
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enrichment is construed syntactically. 
 On the syntactic conception, the interpretation of an utterance proceeds in three 
steps. First, the linguistic module delivers a syntactico-semantic representation 
determined by sentence grammar irrespective of all pragmatic considerations. That is 
the Logical Form of the sentence. Second, the Logical Form is mapped to a more 
elaborate representation by various processes, including pragmatic processes such as 
free enrichment. The resulting representation is what bears truth-conditions. The 
assignment of truth-conditions to that representation is the third step in the process. 
 The picture I have just sketched is very widespread (though not among 
semanticists). Chomsky himself once defended that picture. He wrote: 
 
I will understand LF to incorporate whatever features of sentence structure (1) enter 
directly into the semantic interpretation of sentences, and (2) are strictly determined 
by properties of sentence grammar. The extension of this concept remains to be 
determined. Assume further that there is a system of rules that associates logical 
form and the product of other cognitive faculties with another system of 
representation SR (read ‗semantic representation‘). Representations in SR, which 
may involve beliefs, expectations and so on, in addition to properties of LF 
determined by grammatical rule, should suffice to determine role in inference, 
conditions of appropriate use etc. (Some would argue that LF alone should suffice, 
but I leave that as an open empirical question.) (Chomsky 1976: 305-306) 
 
It is, as Chomsky points out, reasonable to keep LF and SR distinct in principle, in 
order not to beg the question at issue, even if one wants to consider the possibility that 
LF-representations (the outputs of the linguistic ‗module‘) and SR-representations 
(those which undergo truth-conditional interpretation) are actually identical.  
 An overwhelming majority of TCP-theorists defend that picture too. That is the 
case, in particular, of those whom Stanley attacks in his paper: Sperber and Wilson, 
Carston, Stainton, and Bach. They explicitly say that pragmatic processes map the 
representations delivered by the linguistic module to the typically richer representations 
involved in linguistic communication. Stanley offers his arguments against 
unarticulated constituents in the course of criticizing the views of these researchers, but 
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if one adopts the above picture, the fact that unarticulated constituents involve bound 
variables no longer raises a problem.
22
  Again, the variables in question will be found 
in the representations delivered by pragmatic processes as they apply to natural 
language structures; they will not be found in the natural language structures 
themselves, hence they will not be articulated in the relevant sense.
23
 
 On the syntactic conception, the representations which undergo truth-
conditional interpretation are not directly the output of the linguistic module, but more 
elaborate, conceptual representations shaped by pragmatic processes and sensitive to 
« beliefs, expectations and so on » (Chomsky‘s words). At some point Stanley criticizes 
similar views (involving distinct representational layers) put forward by Partee and by 
Culicover and Jackendoff. According to them it is Discourse Representation Structures 
(Partee) or Conceptual Structures (Culicover and Jackendoff) that are given truth-
conditional interpretations, rather than the syntactic structures of the natural language 
expressions which are mapped onto them by some preliminary process of interpretation. 
Criticizing those views, Stanley writes: 
 
This picture of interpretation is prima facie difficult to accept. According to it, the 
interpretative process involves the production of an interpretively superfluous level 
of representation, namely the output of the syntactic mechanism. We would need a 
massive amount of empirical and methodological motivation to justify the added 
complexity such an interpretive process involves over straightforwardly applying a 
semantic interpretation to the output of our best syntactic theory. (Stanley 2000: 428) 
 
This can be turned into a critique of the syntactic picture of free enrichment, so let me 
                                                 
22 See Carston forthcoming for a response to Stanley along those lines. 
23 If we buy this syntactic interpretation of free enrichment for dealing with ‗bound‘ unarticulated 
constituents, this does not prevent us from appealing to the other form of free enrichment in other cases. 
Instead of speaking of two ‗interpretations‘ of free enrichment, we should therefore speak of two 
varieties. Note that it is possible to accept both that ‗syntactic‘ unarticulated constituents are supplied in 
going from the logical form of the sentence to the thought it expresses, and that ‗semantic‘ unarticulated 
constituents are supplied in providing a truth-conditional interpretation for the thought in question. 
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offer a brief response in closing this article. 
 First, on the syntactic conception the output of the syntactic mechanism is not 
superfluous; it is the properly linguistic input to the comprehension process. Second, 
the empirical and methodological motivation for the multi-representational view can be 
found in the work of researchers in pragmatics and neighbouring areas of cognitive 
science. Third, we need not say that semantic (truth-conditional) interpretation applies 
to conceptual representations instead of applying to syntactic representations. If we are 
persuaded that LF-representations are directly interpretable — a claim which a 
Contextualist will reject (§1.2.) — we can opt for an hybrid view according to which 
both LF-representations and SR-representations are subject to truth-conditional 
interpretation. That is indeed the view defended by advocates of the ‗syncretic view‘ 
(Recanati 2001, section 3). On this view, each utterance has two sets of truth-
conditions. First, there are the truth-conditions of the sentence, obtained by submitting 
the LF-representation to semantic interpretation (in context). Second, there are the 
truth-conditions of the richer representation resulting from the interplay of linguistic 
and pragmatic factors. Unarticulated constituents affect only the second set of truth-
conditions. 
 Could we decide that only truth-conditional interpretation in the first sense (that 
which applies to LF-representations) matters to semantics, and relegate the other sort of 
truth-conditions to the realm of nonliteral meaning? That is what Bach and many others 
do, but the price to pay is high; for the truth-conditions thus delivered by directly 
interpreting the syntactic structures of natural language sentences turn out to be very 
different from the intuitive truth-conditions of utterances. For example, the truth-
conditions of sentence (8) (on the base-generated analysis) will be such that (8) will be 
true, provided it rains somewhere sometime. This is very far from the intuitive truth-
conditions of (8) (in the mot salient interpretation, involving a bound unarticulated 
constituent). Bach is prepared to pay that price but Stanley himself is not, as I pointed 
out in §1.2. « Accounting for our ordinary judgments about the truth-conditions of 
various sentences is the central aim of semantics », Stanley and Szabo say. 
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Accordingly, they find it « worrisome » that on approaches such as Bach‘s, « one has to 
abandon ordinary intuitions concerning the truth or falsity of most sentences » (Stanley 
and Szabo 2000: 240). But that is what happens if, applying semantic interpretation 
directly to LF-representations, we discount unarticulated constituents.
24
 
 
Appendix 
 
In footnote 24 I said that adverb-dropping inferences can be accounted for in terms of variadic functions. 
Here is a brief sketch of how that can be done. 
A relation (i.e., a set of interconnected argument roles) will be said to be loaded when all its 
argument-roles have been assigned fillers. A loaded relation can be represented as a set of ordered pairs, 
each ordered pair consisting of an argument-role and a filler (an argument assigned to that role).  Each 
atomic statement such as ‗John kisses Mary‘ determines a loaded relation, such that the statement is true 
iff that loaded relation obtains. In the ‗John kisses Mary‘ case the loaded relation determined by the 
statement features John in the Kisser role and Mary in the Kissee role. 
A loaded relation obtains iff there is an event e such that, in that event, each filler plays the role 
it has been assigned to and nothing else plays that role. Thus if the loaded relation R+ is {<R1, a1>, <R2, 
a2>,..., <Rn, an>}, R
+ holds iff there is an e such that a1 uniquely plays the role R1 in e, a2 uniquely 
plays the role R2 in e,..., and an uniquely plays the role Rn in e. Consider now the standard Davidsonian 
examples: ‗John buttered a piece of toast‘ and ‗John buttered a piece of toast with a knife‘. The 
prepositional phrase ‗with a knife‘ contributes a circumstantial variadic function as well as a filler for the 
                                                 
24  I am indebted to Robyn Carston, Eros Corazza, Steven Davis, Larry Horn, John Perry, and Jason 
Stanley for detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to K. Bach, J. Dokic, P. Jacob, P. 
Kay, T. Matsui, S. Neale, G. Nunberg, E. Pacherie, P. Schlenker, R. Stainton, D. Sperber, I. Stojanovic 
and K. Taylor for relevant discussions. Many thanks are due to to my students and colleagues at Institut 
Jean-Nicod (formerly CREA), as well as to the participants in the Pragmatics and Cognitive Science 
conference in Oxford (sept. 2000) and the Indexicality seminar in Paris (2000-2001), where the paper 
was discussed. Extensive comments by three referees for this journal were extremely helpful and I  am 
most grateful to them. 
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extra argument-role. (To keep matters simple, I ignore tense as well as the indefinite nature of ‗a knife‘ 
and ‗a piece of toast‘.) Since variadic functions do not change the assignment of fillers to argument-roles, 
but merely suppress or (as in this case) add an argument-role, the loaded relation determined by ‗John 
buttered a piece of  toast with a knife‘ will necessarily include the loaded relation determined by ‗John 
buttered a piece of toast‘. It will, therefore, not be possible for the former to obtain without the latter also 
obtaining; which means that ‗John buttered a piece of toast with a knife‘ entails ‗John buttered a piece of 
toast‘. (Note that this inference pattern goes well beyond adverbial modification; we find it whenever a 
variadic function operates, whether or not it belongs to the circumstantial variety. Just as ‗John buttered a 
piece of toast with a knife‘ entails ‗John buttered a piece of toast‘, ‗John eats an apple‘ entails ‗John 
eats‘, and ‗John speaks to Paul‘ entails ‗John speaks‘. The same mechanism is arguably responsible for 
the inference from ‗John walks the dog‘ to ‗The dog walks‘, or from ‗Paula broke the vase‘ to ‗The vase 
broke‘.)  
 In this analysis the truth-conditions of action sentences turn out to be Davidsonian, in the sense 
that there is quantification over events and adverbial modifiers ultimately contribute extra conjuncts in 
the scope of the quantifier. But the quantification and the conjuncts are found only in the semantic 
metalanguage. In the object language there is no extra argument place for events, and adverbial modifiers 
contribute variadic functions. It is the inclusion relation between the loaded relations contributed by the 
statements which accounts for the entailment relation between the statements themselves. 
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